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
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
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
COMBATTING THE TERRORIST THREAT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LARRY B. BERRONG, MPC
LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL T. GERARD, JR., MPC

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begins with a trend analysis for 1984, followed by a historical overview of eleven terrorist groups and their current operations, and a presentation of the projected threat and potential impact of terrorist actions on three big regions of the world--the Caribbean Basin, Europe, and the Middle East. A review of current national and departmental policies has also been completed to gain insight into the readiness of the US to deal with the problem. The authors conclude that--terrorism will continue through the 1980's, worldwide cooperation and interaction is needed to quell the rise in terrorist activities, the US will continue to be a prime target, and the US government structure is not fully prepared to deal with the problem. Several recommendations are presented.

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USA/C MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

COMBATTING THE TERRORIST THREAT

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR(S): Larry B. Berrong, LTC, MPC
Paul T. Gerard, Jr., LTC, MPC

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	1
Background	1
Investigative Procedures	2
II. THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	3
Introduction	3
Terrorist Trends	5
Terrorist Groups	18
Other Terrorist Groups	32
Projected Threat	38
Impact of Terrorism on US National Security	43
III. POLICY AND DOCTRINE	51
General	51
National Policy	53
Department of Defense Policy	60
Army Doctrine	63
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS	79
National Strategy	79
Military Strategy	83
BIBLIOGRAPHY	86
APPENDIX 1. TERRORIST INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST US ARMY PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES SINCE 1980	94
2. COMMAND AND CONTROL ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	98

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

International terrorism has grown at an alarming rate since accurate recordings of terrorist activities began in 1968. The past six years (1979-1984) have been particularly significant because of the number of attacks, the indiscriminate killings and the injuries accomplished during these attacks, and the increase in state sponsored terrorism. The last six years are also significant because this is the first time the US government has attempted to organize itself to counter terrorism and become proactive in working with other free nations of the world to attack the problem. Of such concern is terrorism to the US government that Mr. Caspar Weinberger addressed terrorism as a separate threat to US national security in his Annual Report to the Congress for fiscal year 1986. It is also significant that in developing the future senior leadership of the Army the US Army War College has integrated various aspects of terrorism into its curriculum and has encouraged students to consider the terrorist threat during exercises where national security objectives, policies, and strategy are developed.

Terrorism will be a threat to the US and its allies through the full spectrum of conflict; encompassing the low, mid, and even the high intensity levels. It is a given that terrorism will be present through the full spectrum of conflict, however, the question is what will the level of intensity be and how will the US respond to it. Today the US and its allies are involved primarily in low intensity conflicts and developing conventional forces to

meet low to mid intensity level conflicts. A portion of this effort is devoted to countering the terrorist threat.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

This study is based on a search of unclassified literature, government documents, and personal interviews of selected personnel in the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and Defense Intelligence Agency. A limitation of the study is that it is unclassified and thus many substantive issues could not be addressed. However, it is felt that the data presented is sufficiently accurate and representative of what is happening so that valid conclusions could be drawn and recommendations made. The privacy of most interviews and personal data not in the public record must be respected. The substance of these interviews, however, is a major element in this study and is reflected throughout this report.

CHAPTER II

THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

Acts of international terrorism are being committed today in regions of the world where peace prevails—West Germany, France, Italy, Puerto Rico, and in regions or countries undergoing various levels of low and mid intensity conflict—Iran and Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, the Philippines. Frequently US personnel, facilities and other interests become the target of these terrorist actions. This chapter addresses the current and projected threat to the United States, what terrorist groups are responsible for carrying out actions, and the potential impact of terrorism on United States national security interests in three strategically important regions of the world.

We have been unable to find one definition of terrorism that has been fully agreed to by all departments of the US government. Therefore, we have chosen to use the definition found in Army Regulation (AR) 190-52, Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations:

The calculated use of violence, or the threat of violence to attain goals, political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.

The regulation also defines a terrorist group as: "A politically, religious, or ideologically oriented group which uses terrorism as its prime mode of operations."

Frederick J. Hacker in his classic, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies, categorizes those terrorists who are idealistically inspired and who seek "not

personal gain, but prestige and power for a collective goal; they believe that they act in the service of a higher cause as 'crusaders.'" He has identified some characteristics of crusaders that should be compared to terrorists as we know them today.¹

— Motivation

- + Unselfish and sacrificial.
- + Realistic, often in service of unrealistic ends.
- + Concrete and abstract goals.
- + Anticipated gain: collective, symbolic, publicity, or material.
- + Attention-getting, ostentatious, dramatic, spectacular, publicity-conscious.
- + Intropunitive and extrapunitive, suicidal and homicidal.

— Cast

- + Small or large groups organized in army like manner (e.g., leagues, fronts, units).
- + Fanatical individuals, often with seemingly intact egos, without overt behavior disturbances.
- + Predictably unpredictable, determined, ruthless.
- + Frequently innovative and violence escalating.

— Victims

- + Selection: for symbolic and/or publicity value.

— Audience

- + Selection: largest group possible (the nation, the world).

Terrorists fall into two broad categories, depending upon where they operate and whose cause they advocate. The national terrorist operates within and aspires to political power primarily within a single nation. Consider, for example, Idi Amin's use of state terror to maintain control of Uganda or the Red Brigades who have been a thorn in the side of the Italian government.

The second category is international terrorism which has been defined by the Rand Corporation as

incidents in which terrorist go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets that have connections with a foreign state (e.g., diplomats, foreign businessmen, officers of foreign corporations), or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel and equipment.²

Frequently, international terrorism is conducted on behalf of the national interests of one sovereign state by a terrorist group from another state.

TERRORIST TRENDS

The statistical data quoted in the trend analysis was extracted from two sources. The 1983 data was taken from the US Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983 published in September 1984. The best statistics that could be found in open source literature for 1984 were provided by the Office of Special Planning, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. These statistics do not represent all terrorist acts, particularly those accomplished by personnel indigenous to a country, and those acts committed in the Soviet bloc countries, Asia, and Africa.

In reviewing the total number of international terrorist incidents for the past six years (Figure 1) several trends become obvious. First, there are periods of increases in terrorist acts followed by decreases. These decreases may be attributed to the effectiveness of governments combatting terrorism in the early 1980's and to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that disrupted terrorist organizations in the Middle East and their followers elsewhere. Secondly, 1981 and 1982 could have been years of rebuilding for older terrorists groups and years of development and birth for new groups. Thirdly, the use of large scale kidnappings, the taking of the hostages at the United States Embassy in Iran, and the mass and indiscriminate killings and maiming in the bombings of

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1979 - 1984




FIGURE 1

the United States Embassy and Marine headquarters in Beirut showed a weak side of the United States. As a result terrorist groups worldwide found they could get media attention, influence public opinion, and accomplish some of their objectives. Because of this perceived success an average of approximately 500 incidents per year for the years 1979-1983 grew to an unprecedented 700 incidents for 1984—a rise of 41 percent over the 1983 total of 500. Bombings, the most popular terrorist tactic, appear they may double over those perpetrated in 1983 (262 incidents).

The majority of international terrorism incidents took place in Western Europe, which had 38.5% of the 1984 (Figure 2) incidents. A total of 151 terrorist attacks were directed against US interests worldwide (Figure 3) in 1984—this is a decrease of approximately 29% from the 1983 total of 205 incidents and is the first decline seen since 1981 (Figure 4). The distribution of incidents directed against the US shows that Latin America (38.4%) is the primary area for attacks against the US while Western Europe is in a close second place with 29.8% of the incidents (Figure 5). Most acts directed against the US military took place in Western Europe (74.1%) as opposed to Latin America where only 3.7% of the incidents were directed against the military (Figure 6).

As mentioned earlier bombings were the most common type of tactic used (Figure 7) and American businesses were the primary targets (Figure 8). In 1983 the US military was the primary target (47 incidents), but 1984 saw a reduction of 43% or 27 incidents (Figure 9).

Terrorist groups today are more violent than ever before. The objective of terrorists is to call public attention to their cause. By employing brutal and bloody violence terrorists construct a general climate of fear that intimidates governments and populations. Leftist terrorists are usually responsible for most of the world's terrorist violence, however, in recent

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 1984




FIGURE 2

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND PROPERTY, 1984

	NORTH AMERICA	LATIN AMERICA	WESTERN EUROPE	USSR/ EASTERN EUROPE	SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA	MIDDLE EAST	ASIA/ PACIFIC	TOTAL
TOTAL	1	58	45	1	9	27	10	151
BARRICADE- HOSTAGE		4					1	5
BOMBING	1	33	25	1	1	12	2	75
ARMED ATTACK		9	6		1	5	1	22
HIJACKING		2			1	2	2	7
ARSON		5	4		1		1	11
KIDNAPPING		2			3	8	3	16
OTHER		3	10		2			15

FIGURE 3

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND PROPERTY,

1979 - 1984

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	TOTAL
TOTAL	188	178	163	211	205	151	1096
KIDNAPPING	8	10	9	8	10	16	61
BARRICADE-HOSTAGE	6	7	1	3	8	5	30
ARMED ATTACK	36	33	29	18	24	22	162
HIJACK	6	4	10	1	1	7	29
BOMBING	92	76	72	109	96	75	520
ARSON	31	23	25	59	36	11	185
OTHER	9	25	17	13	30	15	109

FIGURE 4

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST US, 1984




FIGURE 5

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST US MILITARY, 1984




FIGURE 6

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST US CITIZENS AND PROPERTY, 1984




FIGURE 7

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST US CITIZENS AND PROPERTY, 1984




FIGURE 8

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS

AGAINST U.S. MILITARY

	LATIN AMERICA	WESTERN EUROPE	MIDDLE EAST	AFRICA
BOMBING		10		1
ARMED ATTACK	1	2	3	0
HIJACKING				1
ARSON		4		
THEFT		2		1
OTHER		2		

FIGURE 9

years rightist groups have conducted a very significant number of the most violent incidents. The year 1983 was the most violent since record keeping began; a total of 1,925 casualties (652 killed and 1,273 injured) during 116 international terrorist incidents. On the US side most of the fatalities for 1983 occurred as a result of the truck bombings of the US Embassy in Beirut and the Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport. If you disregard these two incidents only 5 US fatalities occurred in 1983 and 1984 had a total of 12 fatalities, making 1984 one of the three most lethal years during the past 10 years (Figure 10).

Because terrorists can make the biggest impression with the least possible risk of identification, bombings have become their favorite tactic. The growth in the number of bombings is also a reflection of the better training in the use of explosives available to terrorists and the increased availability of high-quality explosives. The Soviet Union, its Eastern Europe allies, and Libya, Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have supplied many terrorist groups with plastique and other explosives to build bombs.³ Using these explosives they have produced vehicle bombs which are totally indiscriminate in who they kill or what they damage. These types of weapons were the prime weapons of choice in 1983 and the Department of State reports that 50 such attacks occurred of which 30 took place in the Middle East, primarily Lebanon.⁴ Officials in the Department of Defense indicate that vehicle bombings in 1984 will probably exceed 1983, statistics confirming this prediction have not yet been published.

In summary, American interests were the targets of fewer terrorist attacks in 1984, however, when attacks did occur they were deadlier. Bombings, kidnappings, and armed attacks against Americans are the most favored tactics of terrorist groups. American businesses operate with highest risk in

U.S. FATALITIES PER TERRORIST ATTACK

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NUMBER OF FATALITIES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS</u>	<u>FATALITIES PER INCIDENTS</u>
1984	12	151	.08
1983	5	205	.02*
1982	7	211	.03
1981	7	163	.04
1980	9	178	.05
1979	15	188	.08
1978	9	123	.07
1977	4	84	.05
1976	7	125	.06
1975	18	104	.17

* 1983 FIGURES DO NOT REFLECT BEIRUT BOMBINGS

FIGURE 10

Latin America, whereas the US military's highest risk is in Western Europe. There is no indication of a reduction in international terrorism, to the contrary it increased significantly during the year 1984. United States personnel and facilities abroad are primarily targeted by Marxist-Leninist factions and Islamic fundamentalist who see the US as imperialistic world power.

Within the continental United States the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported only eight acts of terrorism during 1984. This figure is down from the two previous years, 1983 (31) and 1982 (51) and has been partially the result of arrests in the past several years of Armenian, Croatian, and Puerto Rican terrorist group members.⁵

TERRORIST GROUPS

Introduction

Alexander Schmid in his book Political Terrorism lists and offers some basic descriptions of several hundred terrorist groups throughout the world. For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to identify each of these groups, but it is necessary to have an understanding of the magnitude of terrorism in the world today. We selected eleven representative terrorist groups to highlight. They were chosen because they have had and/or are currently having a direct impact on US security interests around the world. The information presented is not all inclusive, but is designed to give an overview of the group and its current operations. In some cases the information may be scant because current information could not be found in open source documents. New groups and variations of old groups materialize almost on a daily basis. For example, on 4 February 1985 a previously unheard of group, the National Front, bombed a bar in Athens, Greece injuring 57 Americans who were mostly servicemen. Many of these groups with support could operate

through the full spectrum of conflicts to supplement the conventional and/or guerrilla forces of the aggressor.

The analysis of the eleven groups is followed by a general discussion of terrorism in Latin America and state supported terrorism. The data used below was drawn from a number of different resources all of which have been listed in the bibliography. Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the impact terrorism can have on United States strategic interests throughout the world.

Group Descriptions

ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN)

HOMEBASE: Puerto Rico and United States

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Puerto Rico and United States (Chicago & New York City)

LINKED WITH: Cuban backed Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP) and Puerto Rican Solidarity Committee

IDEOLOGY: Independence for Puerto Rico.

BACKGROUND: The movement started in 1974 with their first dramatic attack carried out against Fraunces Tavern in New York City where four people were killed and 54 were injured. Since then they have carried out more than 100 attacks against civilian and military targets in the United States and Puerto Rico. Their primary means of attack has been the use of bombs, however, some sniping has taken place. In the early 1980's the United States military became special targets in both the United States and Puerto Rico. United States personnel and facilities in Puerto Rico, armed forces recruiters and recruiting stations in Chicago and New York City, and power stations have all been targets of the FALN.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: FALN has failed to make a significant political impact regarding independence for Puerto Rico and the FBI has had some success in halting their activities. In 1983 the FBI raided a safehouse in Chicago and arrested four members of the group who were in possession of semiautomatic weapons, homemade silencers, and explosives. These arrests prevented planned bombings, armed robberies, and prison breaks and also led to the June 1983 arrest of FALN leader and bomb-maker William Morales in Mexico. In 1982, there were 25 acts of terrorism carried out by FALN. This was reduced to only three in 1983 and is partially the result of the FBI's investigative efforts. This group, like other terrorist organizations have done, is capable of "raising its head" again in support of Puerto Rican independence.

BORICUA POPULAR ARMY (MACHETE WIELDERS)

Ejercito Popular Boricua (Los Macheteros)

HOMEBASE: Puerto Rico

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Puerto Rico and United States (Chicago)

LINKED WITH: Supported by the 6000 voter Marxist-Leninist Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), led by Jose Mari Bras, a close political colleague of Fidel Castro of Cuba.

IDEOLOGY: Leftist pro-Puerto Rican independence

BACKGROUND: The group emerged in 1978 in Puerto Rico and began targeting police and military who to them are representatives of US domination. They are one of the most violent groups in Puerto Rico and have carried out numerous attacks against US personnel and facilities. Two of their more significant attacks include: a joint operation with other terrorists to attack a US Navy personnel bus at Sebaná Seca in December 1979 and a January 1981 attack against a Puerto Rican Air National Guard base at Muniz Airport where nine jet aircraft were damaged or destroyed.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: This group's last significant anti-US military terrorist act occurred in Puerto Rico in May 1982 when one Navy enlisted man was killed.

DIRECT ACTION

Action Directe (AD)

HOMEBASE: France

AREA OF OPERATIONS: France, Belgium and West Germany

LINKED WITH: Red Army Faction in Germany, Fighting Communist Cells in Belgium, Basque terrorists in Spain, Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) in France, and the Italian Red Brigades.

IDEOLOGY: Anti-imperialism

BACKGROUND: The group made its first appearance in France in May 1979 and appeared to French authorities to have a membership comprised of members from older terrorist groups, the International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI) and the Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy (NAPAP); primarily Maoist and anti-France activists. During the years 1979 and 1980 Direct Action conducted approximately two dozen attacks against pure French targets such as the French employer's federation, offices of the factory and labor inspectorate and magistrate's court. In March 1980, French authorities arrested 20 members of the group and as a result outlawed Direct Action in August 1982. Two specific points about this group are worth noting. First, plastic explosives and anti-tank weapons, the weapons it used indicate international links. Also their training was of a degree not normally found in indigenous French terrorist groups. Secondly, the members showed knowledge of computers and some of their attacks have been carried out against computer companies.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: In 1984 Direct Action announced it was changing its tactics after an aborted attack against the Paris office of the Western

European Union. In January 1985 it announced the formation of a joint "political-military front" with the Red Army Faction to wage a more effective fight against "NATO politics" and other Western defense related activities—including the deployment of cruise missiles and the Pershing II. On 26 January 1985 France's chief arms salesman, General Rene Audran, a Defense Ministry official in charge of arms exports, was assassinated by Direct Action. In conjunction with the Red Army Faction and Fighting Communist Cells it has been reported that Direct Action has also been involved with the bombings of NATO pipelines and other facilities in Belgium.

LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (LARF)

HOMEBASE: France

AREA OF OPERATIONS: France

LINKED WITH: Direct Action—France, PLO

IDEOLOGY: Anti-United States, and anti-Zionist

BACKGROUND: During the early 1980's LARF began claiming responsibility for some of the most violent terrorist attacks in France. In 1981 they attempted to kill a US diplomat in Paris and in January 1982 were successful in assassinating Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Ray, the US assistant military attache in Paris. Also in 1982 and 1983 they were successful in carrying out attacks against Israeli diplomats and embassy personnel allegedly in support of the PLO. During 1983 French police were able to arrest several members of the group and thought they had stifled LARF operations. However, in late 1983 LARF bombed the US and Algerian stands at the International Trade Fair in Marseilles, killing one person and injuring 26.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: In February 1984 LARF claimed responsibility along with the Red Brigades for the assassination of Leamon Hunt, the ranking civilian in

charge of the US group monitoring the Israeli-Egyptian Sinai Accord. It has not been singled out for any other recent actions, however, it is highly probable that LARF is conducting operations with Direct Action.

DIRECT ACTION (BELGIUM SECTION)

Fighting Communist Cells

Communist Combatant Cells (CCC)

HOMEBASE: Belgium

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Belgium

LINKED WITH: Red Army Faction, and Direct Action—France

IDEOLOGY: Anti-NATO

BACKGROUND: Appears to have emerged in October 1984 and has since carried out bomb attacks against nine NATO related targets in Belgium. A communique released by the organization singled out Belgium for an "armed political-military struggle" because NATO has located both its political and military headquarters in that country. On 11 December 1984 the group bombed the NATO emergency pipeline shutting it down for 48 hours. Prior to January 1985 the group had avoided tactics such as kidnappings and bombings that would injure or kill people. On 15 January 1985 a communique was found at the site of a bombing of the US headquarters in Brussels which warned its subsequent actions could kill US personnel.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: The 15 January 1985 bombing caused \$500,000 damage to US facilities and did injure two US Army military policemen. There are also indications that explosives supplied by this group were to be used by the Red Army Faction to bomb the US Army school in Oberammergau.

RED ARMY FACTION

Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)

HOMEBASE: West Germany

AREA OF OPERATIONS: West Germany, France, Belgium

LINKED WITH: Direct Action—France, Fighting Communist Cells—Belgium, PLO

IDEOLOGY: Extreme left, anti-American, anti-nuclear, and anti-NATO

BACKGROUND: The RAF was established in West Germany between 1970 and 1972.

Their roots began during the 1968 student revolt in Berlin over the involve-

ment of the US in Vietnam. Additionally, they were upset over the Israeli-

Palestinian issue and the nature of democratic law, education and government.

Their targets became US facilities, Israeli airlines, West German magistrates, school buildings, and government offices. RAF attacks against the US began in earnest in 1970 and in May 1972 they conducted a series of 15 coordinated bomb

attacks in Frankfurt, killing one American officer. A West German police crackdown between 1973 and 1977 resulted in the arrest of the major leaders of

the group. In 1977 a second wave of attacks by the RAF began with the murders of Seigfried Bubach, the chief federal prosecutor and Hanns Martin Schleyer,

head of the West German Industries Federation. In June 1979 the RAF attempted

to assassinate General Alexander Haig in Belgium. This second wave of attacks demonstrated better organization and tactics on the part of the group, and

greater violence in carrying out their attacks. Major arrests in 1978 and 1979 quieted the group until 1980 when during an attempt to kill Federal

Prosecutor Kurt Rebmanns two of the terrorist were killed in an automobile accident. In 1981 they began attacking military targets and attempted to

assassinate General Frederick Kroesen, Commander-in-Chief US Army Europe. Arrests after this incident seemed to quiet the group again.

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CURRENT OPERATIONS: On 4 December 1984, thirty RAF members scattered in various jails in West Germany began a hunger strike to force their jailers to

group them together as political prisoners. As a result of this strike there has been a revival of RAF activities, some conducted jointly with Direct Action and the Fighting Communist Cells. On 18 December 1984 there was attempted an attack against the US-NATO school in Oberammergau. On 19 December 1984 a bomb was defused outside the Weisbaden air base and on 30 December a US intelligence building in Dusseldorf was bombed. In January 1985 the US consul's home in Frankfurt was fire bombed, a bomb exploded near the NATO fuel pipeline in Karlsruhe, the RAF announced it was joining with Direct Action to attack NATO installations, and the Stuttgart US Army computer center was bombed. On 1 February the top executive of a West German company that produced engines for NATO tanks was killed.

RED BRIGADES

Brigate Rosse (BR)

HOME BASE: Italy

AREA OF OPERATION: Italy

LINKED WITH: Red Army Faction, PLO, groups in Uruguay and Argentina

IDEOLOGY: Espouse a strong anti-Italian government, anti-NATO, and anti-imperialist ideology

BACKGROUND: The Red Brigades were founded in 1969 by Renato Curcio and his wife, Margherita Cagol and consisted primarily of former Catholic students from the sociology department of the University of Trent. Some of the members were disillusioned members of the People's Communist Party (PCI). The early group was largely confined to Milan where they distributed pamphlets and damaged the property of prominent conservatives and businessmen, as well as taking actions against the ultra-right Italian Social Movement (MSI). The Red Brigades first challenged the government in 1974 when they kidnapped Mario Sossi, an attorney general responsible for prosecuting terrorists. Between

1974 and 1976 several members of the initial nucleus of the group were arrested after a series of prison escapes and bank robberies committed for the cause. A new group of more brutal, but less ideologically prepared leaders emerged. This group selected targets designed to undermine the "establishment"—magistrates, jurors, journalists and editors, teachers and university professors, and Christian Democratic supporters. In March 1978 Aldo Moro, former premier and architect of several coalition governments, was kidnapped and later killed. In 1979 the BR directed its campaign at the Christian Democratic party during the election year. In the early 1980's they continued attacks on Christian Democratic spokesmen, Italian companies, policemen and magistrates. In December 1981 General James Dozier was kidnapped and this incident opened a new era of attacks by the Red Brigades against NATO and foreign targets. Following the Dozier kidnapping intensive police antiterrorist operations resulted in numerous arrests and convictions of Red Brigade members. As an example of police and court interest in disbanding the group in January 1983 thirty-two members were sentenced to life terms for the Moro killing.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: In early 1984 three columns of the Red Brigades were reported to be active: the Roman column, the Stella Rossa column in Milan, and a column in Tuscany. It is not known how many members the organization currently has because some have fled to France and others have left the organization completely. There have been some indications of Red Brigade links with the Naples-based Camorra, which is northern Italy's equivalent of the Sicilian Mafia. In February 1984 the Red Brigades, possibly in conjunction with Middle East terrorists, assassinated Leamon R. Hunt, an American who served as the director-general of the Sinai multinational force. In 1984 only four incidents were attributed to the Red Brigades: two murders, one injury,

and one barricaded hostage robbery. Despite the successes of the Italian government the Red Brigades are still a group that needs to be closely watched. There have been indications that the group wants to align with hard line members of the antinuclear and peace movement groups protesting the deployment of nuclear missiles in Italy.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

Munadamat Tahir Falistin

HOMEBASE: Tunisia

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Worldwide, however, primarily in Middle East

LINKED WITH: Soviet Union, East Germany, Libya, Red Army Faction, Red Brigades, Basque Separatists, Japanese Red Army, Neo-Nazis, and numerous other groups.

IDEOLOGY: Elimination of Israel through armed struggle.

BACKGROUND: The PLO and its military arm, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) were created by the 1964 Arab Summit Conference. Efforts to integrate all Palestinian groups into the PLO have failed, however, it remains an umbrella organization that shelters terrorist groups, but at the same time operates on an international basis as a diplomatic front for Palestinian interests. The United Nations recognized the PLO in 1974 and in 1976 the PLO became a member of the Arab League. Since its establishment the PLO has waged war against Israel primarily with terrorist operations and has served as a conduit for terrorist groups throughout the world providing them training and equipment. In June 1982 members of "Black June," a PLO splinter group, attempted to assassinate Israel's ambassador to Great Britain. As a result Israel invaded Lebanon, the PLO's homebase, where they overran PLO refugee camps. In August 1982, with the concurrence of Israel, the PLO evacuated Beirut for eight Arab countries that agreed to accept them. As a result of the internal PLO strife

surrounding the evacuation the PLO's capability to carry out terrorist and conventional operations has been weakened. In 1982 there were nine verified PLO operations.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: Bruce Hoffman of Rand Corporation has identified Palestinian current operations as:

- There has been little change in the total level of Palestinian terrorism against Israel when measured over six month intervals since January 1982, however, there has been a decline of operations inside Israel.
- Surrogate attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets outside Israel increased dramatically in the six months following the invasion, but fell again after December 1982.
- Proxy operations carried out against other nations have increased. US military and diplomats have become targets.
- More attacks have been carried out against Palestinian and Arab targets than against Israeli targets.
- During the first four months of 1984 there was an increase in Palestinian terrorism in both Europe and Israel.

To qualify what Hoffman has said it must be noted that he was not only referring to the PLO, but also other Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Black June, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). However, in many cases the PLO has been involved either as an instigator of the operation or a receiver of a terrorist action carried out by an opponent Palestinian group. In 1983 there were four terrorist attacks which can be directly attributed to the PLO. It is generally believed that the PLO will selectively use acts of terrorism to achieve their objectives while maintaining a relatively low profile during the rebuilding of their organization. Yassir Arafat serves as

a moderating influence and if something were to happen to him radicals in the organization may renew the previous fervent level of terrorist operations. The real threat to world order from the PLO appears to be their use of surrogates. For the past ten years the PLO has established linkages with other terrorists groups and revolutionary movements and has increased their interest in Latin America. They have called in their debts in Western Europe and Latin America using their friends to attack Israeli targets. The PLO has provided arms and training to the Sandinistas against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. It operates training camps in Nicaragua where revolutionaries from El Salvador and other Latin American countries receive training. The PLO as a legitimate nation is active in more than a dozen other countries in the western hemisphere. They remain an organization to be concerned about in the terrorist realm.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)

Jabhat al-Shaabiya li Tahrir Falistin

HOMEBASE: South Yemen

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Middle East, Western Europe, Africa

LINKED WITH: PLO, South Yemen, Libya

IDEOLOGY: Marxist-Leninist leaning with objective of eliminating the state of Israel.

BACKGROUND: Dr. George Habbash created the PFLP in December 1967 with a merger of four organizations—the Movement of Arab Nationalists, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Heroes of the Return, and Vengeance Youth. Habbash formed the group as a rival to FATAH and to inject a Marxist-Leninist flavor into the Palestinian nationalist movement. The PFLP rejects all forms of compromise on the Israel issue and has carried out some of the most notorious terrorist attacks. In 1968 it hijacked an El Al aircraft enroute from Rome to

Tel Aviv and as a result world attention was refocused on the Palestinian issue. In September 1969 it hijacked three aircraft, with 400 passengers, to Dawson Field in Jordan where two of the aircraft were blown up. King Hussein of Jordan expelled Palestinian guerrillas as a result of this incident. In May 1972 the PFLP organized members of the Japanese Red Army for an attack at Lod in which 27 people were killed. In 1975 and 1976 the organization carried out attacks against Israeli aircraft in Paris and Istanbul. They also conducted the operations at Entebbe in June 1976 and at Mogadishu in 1977. CURRENT OPERATIONS: Since 1982 the PFLP has been headquartered in Damascus and is being used by the Syrians to carry out attacks against Israel.

BLACK JUNE ORGANIZATION (ABU NIDAL GROUP)

Munadamat Huzairan al-Aswad

HOMEBASE: Iraq

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Middle East, Western Europe

LINKED WITH: Iraq

IDEOLOGY: Hard line support for the establishment of a Palestinian state and elimination of Israel.

BACKGROUND: Abu Nidal, a former member of Fatah, founded the group in June 1976 to wage war against Israel in behalf of Iraq and to counteract Syrian influence in Lebanon. Iraq supported the group with training, facilities, arms and finances. Black June opposes the PLO's conciliatory line and in 1978 carried out attacks against PLO representatives in London, Kuwait, Paris, and Istanbul. After this series of attacks Black June agreed to a truce with Fatah and other Palestinian groups. In the early 1980s Black June carried out an attack against the congregation of a Vienna synagogue, after they had first murdered a city counsellor prominent in the Austrian Israeli lobby. In 1982 they attacked the Israeli ambassador in London and as a result Israel invaded

Lebanon in retaliation. Following this there have been attacks in Paris, Karachi, and Madrid.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: In April 1983 the group claimed responsibility for killing a pro-Israeli PLO leader in Portugal. In the fall of 1983 Black June began an assassination campaign against Jordanian diplomats in an attempt to dissuade that government from joining with the PLO in opening negotiations with Israel on the Palestinian homeland issues. In late 1983 President Saddam Husayn of Iraq declared public that Black June had been expelled from his country. The group shifted its operations to Damascus and began serving Syrian interests by working to dissuade moderate PLO membership not to undertake independent actions with Israel that would be counter to Syrian political objectives. The US Department of State considers this group, of all the Palestinian groups, to have the greatest threat for US interests in the Middle East.

LEBANESE SHIITE MOSLEMS (ISLAMIC HOLY WARS)

Islamic Jihad

HOMEBASE: Lebanon

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Lebanon and purportedly the United States

LINKED WITH: Syria, Iran, and the PLO

IDEOLOGY: Islamic, with goals of isolating Iraq, spreading Shiite Islam, and impeding Arab negotiations with Israel.

BACKGROUND: Little is known about the composition of the group and its formation, however, it appears it was responsible for a number of bombing attacks in the Middle East during 1983 and 1984. It is well-known for its suicide bombing attacks against the US Embassy, and United States and French Multinational Forces in Beirut during September 1984. These attacks resulted in an unprecedented 557 casualties. The Shiites are particularly dangerous because

of their convictions that they are fighting a holy war in which a martyr's death will send him to paradise.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: In December 1984 this group hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner and flew it to Iran where two American passengers were killed. Also in December Swiss and Italian police prevented a planned attack on the US Embassy in Rome. In January 1985 the Belgian press reported the group was planning attacks in Brussels to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Iranian revolution. Threats by the Islamic Jihad have caused real concern in the US and resulted in increased security for personnel and facilities in the United States and abroad.

OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS

Latin America

Historically acts of terrorism have been used in Latin America as a means to achieve political and other objectives.

The mainland states of Latin America, from Mexico to Argentina, continue to play a particularly important role in the history of contemporary political violence. The omnipresence of the Brazilian Carlos Marighella's 'Mini-Manual of Guerrilla Warfare' in the hideouts of such different groups as the ETA, IRA, PLO, and Baader-Meinhof Gang is a demonstration of Latin America's importance as a source for terrorist theory and practice. . . .⁶

Latin American terrorist groups can be compared to the Red Army Faction in Germany and Red Brigades in Italy in that all seem to have as their primary purpose the disruption of society as opposed to defeating the established government's military. They all operate in the immediate present—what happens today is much more important, significant, and symbolic than tomorrow.

Today terrorist actions carried out against US interests occur primarily in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, and Chile. Of these the most significant activities have taken place in Colombia. Here a

very high crime rate has been augmented by terrorist activities of four primary terrorist groups. The two largest groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19). These groups have been involved in kidnappings, assassinations, bombings and armed confrontations with the police.⁷ During the latter part of 1984 and in early 1985 extraditions of Colombian drug traffickers to the US have caused many threats against US interests in Colombia and also in the United States. The situation is so threatening that the US Ambassador to Colombia and part of his staff have departed the country. Reports by the US news media indicate the drug traffickers have combined forces with terrorist to retaliate against the Colombian and American governments. A recent article in Newsweek⁸ indicated that Colombia's neo-Nazi illegal drug czar, Carlos Fehder Riva, offered to join the leftist M-19 guerrillas. The Colombian drug lords have vowed to kill Colombian officials from the president down and have allegedly offered \$350,000 to anyone who kidnaps US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) head Francis Mullen.

Nicaragua is one of the primary promoters of terrorism in Latin America. It uses terrorism, sabotage, espionage, and subversion to further its objectives of destabilizing non-Marxists governments throughout the region. It has provided arms, financial support, and safehavens for revolutionary groups from El Salvador and Honduras.⁹

In Peru the Maoist guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) has been escalating its activities against public utilities, government ministries and businesses. They have also conducted attacks against the US Embassy and US-Peruvian cultural centers. This group has also been tied to peasant coca growers in Peru who process the coca leaves into cocaine for sale on the international market. Terrorist activity has increased in Chile where the

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties seem to be in the forefront. US banks and cultural centers have been their targets.

It is interesting to note that when Michael S. Radu wrote his article on "Terror, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Latin America" in 1984 he predicted

. . . it appears likely that more practical and operational cooperation at the international level will develop, with the Latin Americans playing a prominent role. . . . The use of indiscriminate terror can thus be expected to decline, while the use of political fronts and mobilization efforts and the internationalist accent of most politically violent groups throughout the world can be expected to increase.¹⁰

Our investigation of this statement would indicate almost the exact opposite of Radu's hypothesis. Terrorism is becoming more indiscriminate and more violent, as readily seen by the recent bombings in the Middle East and Western Europe. In addition President Reagan has reported increased support to groups in Latin America by Iran, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).¹¹ He also suggested that the Ayatollah Khomeini may be seeking to introduce into Latin America terrorist tactics used in the Middle East. From this information one can only assume that the problems of the United States will only increase before we see a downward trend in terrorist violence and insurgency activity in that area of the world.

Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe

Too often attention is focused on the actions of left-wing terrorist groups and not enough attention is paid to the right-wing terrorist groups. In 1980, three bombings were allegedly carried out by neo-fascist or neo-Nazis in Italy, West Germany, and France—these events drew world attention to the threat posed by the right-wing. Prior to the 1980's both Germany and Italy had significant problems with right-wing groups, however, it appears these

countries down played the scale of their activities; for example in West Germany,

In 1977, 616 incidents of neo-Nazi violence and vandalism were reported. In 1980, this figure had nearly tripled to 1,533. In 1978 and 1979 police seized 2,000 rounds of ammunition and nine hand grenades; in 1980, these figures had climbed to 20,000 and more than 100 respectively.¹²

In 1982 there was a decline in right-wing activities, but an increase in severity. On 25 June 1982, the neo-Nazis entered a bar in Nuremberg frequented by black American soldiers, firing into the crowd the terrorist killed two American soldiers and an Egyptian, and several others were wounded. In November 1982 a bomb exploded in the underground garage of an apartment building near Frankfurt where US soldiers and their families lived. In December 1982 explosives were found in cars at two other US bases and on 15 December 1982 two bombs exploded in a car park at the US base in Darmstadt.

Right-wing groups in West Germany, France, and Italy have received equipment, intelligence, and training from the PLO. These arrangements could have proven mutually beneficial to both sides, because, "The PLO leadership concluded that, once trained, anti-Semitic West German extremists could be used in attacks against Israeli or Jewish targets."¹³ In fact this approach worked because in 1980 Karl Hoffman, leader of the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman (Defense Sports Group Hoffman), ordered the murder of a Jewish publisher in Erlangen. After the killing the assassin fled to a Palestinian camp.¹⁴

Of concern today is the fact that Right and Left are combining forces to oppose the deployments of US cruise and Pershing II missiles. Although operations by the right have declined they

... have not been dormant. They have been building a clandestine international support network, exploiting the ideological affinity that exists between themselves and their left-wing counterparts and, in the case of the German neo-Nazis, commencing operations against US military personnel stationed in Germany. To presume that

right-wing extremists no longer pose a threat would be self-deceptive, if not dangerously naive.¹⁵

State Supported Terrorism

State supported terrorism is not a new concept, however, it has only recently been brought to the forefront as a problem that must be solved if terrorism is to be stopped.

It is high time for the scholars and statesmen, who live in nations that have some right to call themselves free, to come to grips with the brute fact of the widespread adoption of calculated terrorism as a preferred instrument of policy by a finite, known number of modern states. The truth is that the use of physical coercion, assassination, and the wanton destruction of property, has become part of the arsenal of geopolitics and will be an important ingredient of international conflict in the 1980's. Terrorism is one of the weapons with which states organized on the principle that political power grows from the barrel of a gun attack their enemies. Open societies built on the moral imperative of preserving the political and economic freedom of individual citizens are the main targets.¹⁶

In contemporary warfare, terrorism can provide a very effective extension of the armed forces of a country. In On War, Clausewitz although not specifically using the term terrorism, did suggest acts of terrorism could be used in conjunction with military operations. However, modern experience reveals that it is used throughout the world in a number of different modes—frequently in isolation from other concerted military efforts. The scope of its current use may have been beyond Clausewitz's comprehension; modern modes of transportation and communications have enabled terrorists to operate in ways Clausewitz could not have foreseen.

A country may employ terrorism as a strategic weapon perhaps as a substitute for "conventional" warfare, e.g., the case of the Palestinians against the Israelis. Or terrorism may be "used as the chosen weapon of conflict by a population segment against another segment and/or a foreign power, e.g., the case of Northern Ireland."¹⁷ In either case, the terrorist can serve as an

extension of a nation's military force. For small nations that cannot man large armed forces, terrorism is an economical way to attack opponents. For the superpower seeking not to be overtly identified with a conflict, terrorism can provide the covert means to get the job done. However terrorists are employed, their objective is to attack and disrupt or destroy the enemy's armed forces, their support systems, or political base. Clausewitz notes that,

If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardship of that situation must not, of course, be merely transient—at least not in appearance.¹⁸

An excellent example of the application of this theory was the seizure of the 52 Americans by the Iranians in October 1980. By making hostages of these Americans, the Iranians destabilized the West, particularly the US, extending Clausewitz' definition of war as the continuation of politics by other means. Another example was the October 1983 bombings of the US Embassy and Marine headquarters in Beirut where 241 military personnel were killed. This particular bombing underscored the fact that terrorist warfare can have a significant political impact—"The blow sapped the will of the US Congress and people to continue a military role in the Lebanese conflict."¹⁹

The US State Department in its Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983 stated that the Soviet Union has provided training, arms, and other direct and indirect support to a number of national insurgent and separatist groups many of which carry out international terrorist attacks as part of their program of revolutionary violence. In addition, the State Department reported that the Soviets maintain close relations with and provide aid to governments and organizations that directly support terrorist groups. They have sold large amounts of weapons to Libya and Syria, supported the PLO and other Palestinian groups, and used Cuba as a surrogate to gain their objectives in Latin America.

Acts of state supported terrorism rose to 97 in 1984, an increase of 38.6% over 1983. Sixty-six of these acts were committed by Iran with Libya running second with 26 incidents. Syria (three incidents) and Somalia (two incidents) were also involved.²⁰ North Korea, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Vietnam have provided bases, sanctuaries, and conduits for supporting terrorism, and have served as springboards for launching terrorist campaigns, sabotage, and border incursions in neighboring states. The 21 January 1985 issue of Newsweek reported that Libya's Colonel Kaddafi had his own terrorist group at work in Lebanon's Beka Valley. The group is called the Palestinian Arab Revolutionary Committee and is being supplied with arms from Libya using Syrian ports. Reportedly the group will carry out "copy cat" tactics used by other radical groups such as Islamic Jihad.²¹

The literature on state sponsored terrorism indicates that the current trend of international terrorist campaigns, although perhaps not directed or started by the Soviets, could not exist without their support and orchestration. International terrorism could very well be part of the Soviet's strategy for spreading their Marxist-Leninist ideology.

PROJECTED THREAT

The US has finally realized that terrorism is a serious threat to world order and must be dealt with on an international scale.

The United States has entered its second decade of contending with the threat posed by terrorist around the world, particularly in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. United States facilities, activities, and personnel continues to be prime targets for terrorist attacks. The propagation of terrorist violence shows no sign of abating and most likely will increase.²²

The threat described here has been developed from open literature and interviews with US government officials. We have been unable to find any

indication that the end to terrorism is in sight. In fact the trend is in the opposite direction and acts of terrorism are on the increase as supported by the upward surge of incidents during 1984. Terrorists have achieved success through mass casual operations, combining of forces use of state support to achieve political objectives, and the inability to survive and regenerate after being hit hard by law enforcement agencies. We believe this projection will be valid at least through the 1980's.

Clausewitz has stated that there are three main objects of warfare: to conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; to take possession of his material and other sources of strength; and to gain public opinion. Although Clausewitz acknowledged the value of terrorists as surrogate forces in warfare he could not have fully comprehended their importance in contemporary warfare when enhanced with modern technology. James B. Motley demonstrates in the following list how terrorism can be used to assist in accomplishing Clausewitz' objectives.

Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare²³

<u>Function</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Means</u>
Psychological	Demoralization of the enemy's government, armed forces, police, civilian population	Assassinations, bombs, explosions, agitations
Material Destruction	Enemy's utilities, communications, and industries	Sabotage
Economic Damage	Deterioration of country's economy, establishment of a state of psychological uneasiness, and uncertainty throughout the country	Intimidation, assassinations, sabotage

Considering both Clausewitz and Motley it can be seen how terrorism will remain a mode of warfare through the full spectrum of threats. In peaceful

regions of the world terrorism will continue to be used by political activists and nations to gain resources and recognition, deter government programs, and spread influence in the Third World. In those countries involved in low intensity conflicts terrorism will be used to frighten the populace, show government ineptness, and cause crises within the government structure. In mid and high intensity conflicts terrorism will be used by aggressor forces to impede deploying forces, destroy command and control elements, cause panic among civilians being evacuated, assassinate key political and military leaders, hinder the deployment of nuclear weapons and munitions from storage facilities, and disrupt lines of communications. The terrorist actions presented above are not all inclusive, but simply represent how they may be employed. The infrastructure is currently present in many terrorist groups where with some additional training and equipping by the Soviets or other countries these groups can become valuable unconventional warfare resources.

The threat to US interests, personnel, and facilities throughout the world will continue. US facilities abroad are attractive targets for terrorist groups because they are usually high in profile and the US government tends to support those governments the terrorists oppose. American and NATO forces in Western Europe will continue to be targets of groups like the Red Army Faction and France's Direct Action as long as nuclear weapons are an issue, and as long as the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles are protested.

Terrorist actions will continue in their destructiveness and lethality as long as they gain world attention. Terrorists survive on publicity and through this publicity they seek to convince the uncommitted to withdraw their support from the government. A prime example of this was the force of public

opinion in the US that persuaded the government to withdraw US peacekeeping forces after the bombings in Beirut in 1983.

Terrorists will continue to use as their prime targets those facilities and personnel who are unprotected or lightly defended, however, the suicide attack where terrorists drive vehicles into defended areas is increasing in popularity. Terrorist generally select targets where there is minimal risks to the personnel carrying out the attacks and optimum political attractiveness. They will use extensive preoperational surveillance of potential targets collecting data on routines, access, personnel and physical security and other factors and then select the target that will give them the most success. Thus bombings have proven to be the most successful tactic followed by kidnappings, hijackings, and assassinations (not in priority order). Keeping this in mind it can only be expected that unprotected US embassies, US business interests abroad, US military on open installations, and US personnel will continue to be attractive targets.

Weapons used by terrorists will continue to range from the unsophisticated to the relatively sophisticated. Terrorists have used small arms and even anti-tank weapons—all of which are readily available on the world arms market for purchase, can be easily stolen from military forces, or are supplied by sponsoring governments. The explosives used in the past have in many cases been of the homemade variety, however commercial and military sources are regularly used. For example, the State Department has reported that explosives stolen in Belgium in the summer of 1984 were later used by the Red Army Faction, France's Direct Action, and Belgium's Fighting Communist Cells.²⁴ Neil Livingstone reports that,

Terrorists seem poised on the threshold of entering a new age of violence and in the words of one observer, possibly even 'going for a homerun,' in other words, building a

weapon of mass destruction. If such a weapon is constructed, it will most assuredly be of a chemical or biological nature, and not a nuclear device.²⁵

He supports this statement by relating that in 1980 French police discovered that the Red Army Faction was producing a botulinal toxin in a Paris apartment and that the Soviet Union has given the PLO training in the use of chemical and biological weapons. The possibility should not be ruled out, however, that a crude nuclear/radioactive device could be built and used by a terrorist group to achieve a political objective. Terrorists have the potential to use every conceivable delivery means on land, in the air, or on or below the water to deliver their weapons. This threat potential must be recognized in designing security systems to meet the threat.

State sponsored terrorism will continue as a mode of cheap warfare. The Soviet Union, Syria, Iran, Cuba, Libya, the PLO, North Korea, and others will continue to underwrite terrorism as a mode to promote their interests. Although the US will remain one of the prime targets throughout the world the Soviet Union will become more visible as a terrorist target. They are currently targets in Afghanistan and have a strong potential to be targets in Poland. Because of the conflict between Islam and Communism the Soviets could also become targets in the Middle East.

At Appendix 1 is a listing of terrorist incidents directed against US Army personnel and facilities during the period January 1980 thru December 1983. Putting this list into perspective serves as an excellent example of the problems US soldiers will face during low intensity conflict and in the rear area during mid and high intensity conflict. Recent history indicates that US interests are vulnerable and will remain so as long as terrorists target the United States.

IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON US NATIONAL SECURITY

We are not convinced that the American public fully understands the impact terrorism can have on US national security and our vital security interests—those interests the United States could go to war to protect. Too often terrorism is looked at for its short-term peacetime affects and not for its long-term strategic affects in limited warfare or full scale war. Addressed earlier in this study was the issue of state supported international terrorism and the key players in that arena. As a natural follow on to this it is imperative that we present our evaluation of the strategic implications of terrorism on a regional basis using specific countries and terrorist organizations as examples of what could happen.

Caribbean Basin

As 1984 begins, the year George Orwell long ago made synonymous with political oppression, the odds increase in favor of Soviet-sponsored revolutionary warfare and spectacular terrorist incidents, many of the latter involving Americans. As the result of incessant drumfire of hostile propaganda against the United States over many years, Americans are the primary targets of terrorism in most foreign countries, particularly in regions destabilized by revolutionary violence. And the United States is not immune from such attacks within its own borders.

Imagine what might occur on a quiet Christmas Eve in 1984 if some one hundred highly trained FALN Puerto Rican saboteurs succeeded in penetrating the perimeter of a number of US military installations in the United States and Puerto Rico. High explosives placed at preselected locations destroy an army ammunition depot, a naval communications station, barracks at a Marine Corps training facility, and a petroleum products storage annex. Repairing the damage to these facilities, amounting to tens of millions of dollars, will require at least one year.

In Washington, D.C., at the same time, a special hit squad operating from a moving vehicle on Massachusetts Avenue launches a rocket projectile over the fence at Vice President George Bush's official residence in the Naval Observatory compound, blowing a huge hole in the back wall. Nobody is injured, and the terrorists are not apprehended.

Shortly after dawn, anonymous callers to the Washington Post instruct reporters where to search for a FALN communique, discovered a short time afterward at the Lincoln Memorial. It reads as follows: 'Last night our brave FALN commando unit attacked major Yankee military facilities in occupied Puerto Rico and at many points within the home territory of the United States. We consider this to be the most daring joint operation of freedom fighters ever undertaken against Yankee colonial domination.' 'The Christmas raid, along with other actions of the courageous FALN soldiers, underscores the seriousness of our demands for the prompt release of all Puerto Rican political prisoners in capitalist jails and the immediate and unconditional independence of Puerto Rico. We will achieve national liberation no matter how high the price. We will continue to strike at the two fronts, one in Puerto Rico and the other in the United States.' 'If our humanitarian and just demands are not met, we will escalate our operations in the near future. No American official responsible for keeping our homeland in the exploiting clutch of capitalist imperialism is safe. Let George Bush and the other Wall Street lackeys beware.'

At the year's end, the public outcry is tremendous—criticizing the inability of law enforcement authorities and the military to deal effectively with terrorism. Many voices insist that the United States should immediately grant Puerto Rican independence. Some suggest that the FALN is a respectable 'freedom fighter' organization motivated only by poverty and social inequity in Puerto Rico. Other voices argue that Soviet and Cuban encouragement of the FALN is the real force that makes such attacks possible and that the US government should go to the source. In the United Nations, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist and Third World nations call for a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the continued 'occupation' of Puerto Rico by the US 'imperialists.' Washington policymaking grinds to a halt in confusion and frustration.²⁶

Cline and Alexander have presented a hypothetical scenario in the foregoing, but it is a very realistic presentation of what can happen if the FALN or Los Macheteros, with the help of Cuba and the Soviet Union, succeed in achieving their Puerto Rican independence objectives. Puerto Rico is an important national security interest to the United States because as part of the geography of the Caribbean Basin it assists in controlling access to the region and protects the Southern flank of the US. The sea lines of communication (SLOCs) crossing the region pass thru critical choke points, i.e.,

between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, that are important to the US particularly in light of the Soviet-Cuban presence in the area. In the event of an attack on NATO, 50% or more of the planned reinforcements of men and materials from the US would transit the Caribbean; in a major war in the Far East, 40% would pass through the region.²⁷ In peacetime approximately 45% of the crude oil imported into the US and 44% of the foreign trade tonnage pass through this area.²⁸ Additionally, the basin has raw materials of strategic importance to the US: oil from Mexico and Venezuela; iron ore from Venezuela; and bauxite from Jamaica and Guyana. Also of importance are the training, testing, development, communications, tracking, monitoring, and surveillance sites located in Puerto Rico and on its neighboring islands that give the US an important military advantage in the Caribbean.

When comparing US interests against Soviet strategic objectives for the area it becomes obvious just how important Puerto Rico and the rest of the Caribbean Basin is. The general Soviet objectives have been described as:

- Political - "to ferment and further forces and regimes which they (the Soviets) consider progressive."
- Security - "is gradually and cautiously to secure access to and maintain naval facilities in the Caribbean Basin so as to improve the projection of Soviet power while undermining that of the United States and its allies."
- Economics - play a lesser role for the Soviets, however, trade has begun with Cuba, Mexico, Costa Rica, Grenada (prior to the US invasion), Nicaragua, Brazil, and Argentina.²⁹

The Soviets are currently operating in the region using conventional and the surrogate forces of Cuba and some terrorist/guerrilla organizations to reach their objectives.

Middle East

The US has three vital interests in the Middle East: the security and survival of the state of Israel; access to the petroleum resources of the region for US, Japan, and Western Europe; and denying any deeper regional Soviet penetration and expansion.

It is well known that the PLO has carried out both conventional and terrorist attacks against Israel for years. If the attacks were to result in the total degradation of the sovereignty of Israel the US would have to take action to protect Israel.

The problem of oil field security against conventional and terrorist attack is immense. The problem does not center around the wellhead itself, but includes the pipelines and internal distribution network, petrochemical complexes, gas/oil separation facilities, pumping stations, loading terminals, and SLOCs. Even under the best conditions the nature of terrorist attacks make defense against them very difficult. For example, the disruption caused by the Islamic Holy War's mining of the Red Sea in August 1984 slowed the flow of oil from the region.³⁰ Another example occurred in 1981 when Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of a hard-line faction of the PLO, threatened to attack Saudi Arabian oilfields to stop the flow of oil to the West if a new Arab-Israeli war broke out over missiles in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia is particularly vulnerable not only because of its location in the Middle East, but also because some two million immigrants (Egyptians, Yemenis, and Palestinians) work there as laborers.³¹

The Soviets are interested in Middle East oil because if they could achieve some leverage over the flow of it they could manipulate European and Japanese oil dependency to erode the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Moreover Soviet control over Persian Gulf oil, would, inevitably have a much more fundamental effect on the US global position and the overall balance of power.

The Soviets can accomplish this by: covertly supporting an increase in terrorism by the PLO, other radical Palestinian groups, or other Third World terrorist groups against moderate Arab regimes; providing Libya and other unstable countries with arms and material or accomplishing their objectives through more conventional Soviet means, i.e., encouraging Syria to put pressure on the Gulf states in the inter-Arab forum.³²

One of the other threats the United States faces in the Middle East has been the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups and the countries supporting them—Iran, Syria, and Libya. The bombing of the US Marines in Beirut by the Islamic Holy War³³ influenced American public opinion so much that forces were withdrawn from the peacekeeping mission. The Islamic Holy War achieved its strategic objective. These groups are difficult to deal with because of their fanaticism—Iran regards terrorism as a valid form of warfare, and their revolution grew on this premise. One of the reasons this group is so dangerous is that there is nothing more holy than becoming a martyr.

Western Europe

During 1984 74.1% of the terrorist attacks against the US military worldwide occurred in Western Europe and 38.5% of the total terrorists incidents were carried out in Western Europe.³⁴ This is particularly significant when the security of most of the free world hinges on the stability of Western Europe and the ability of the NATO alliance to defend itself.

In the later part of 1984 and early 1985 NATO pipelines, airfields, administrative facilities, and personnel were the targets of terrorist activities in West Germany, France, Belgium, and Spain. Additionally, key civilians engaged in military arms production in France and West Germany have been assassinated. Some of the terrorist groups, both right and left wing, have indicated their desires to see the deployments of the Pershing II and cruise

missiles halted. These actions only serve as an example of what could happen in the Western Europe area of operations during war. Either on their own or working in support of Soviet Spetznaz forces terrorists could prevent NATO deployments and reinforcement by damaging the port of Rotterdam, interdicting the distribution of nuclear munitions from storage sites, disrupting the flow of traffic on main supply routes, cutting land line communications, relaying intelligence information, sabotaging POMCUS stocks and numerous other actions. If these actions were successful NATO would be seriously impaired in its efforts to protect itself.

During peacetime terrorist actions can hurt the morale of NATO soldiers and their dependents, work toward persuading one or more countries not to accept cruise missiles or Pershing IIs on their soil, encourage US public opinion to call for the withdrawal of US forces from NATO territory, and cause NATO governments to think hard before allowing overflight or landing in situations where a new Middle East was threatening the Persian Gulf.

As stated in the introductory paragraph to this section, people too often fail to consider the long term strategic impact of terrorist operations. A further example of this is the Philippines where the primary interest of the US people and news media appears to be focused on civil rights issues surrounding the Marcos government. However, behind the scenes is the emerging communist New People's Army who are conducting terrorist actions to harass foreign and local companies in the countryside. The actions of this group should be of particular concern to the US because of our military bases in the Philippines and their strategic importance to East Asia and the Pacific.

CHAPTER II

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CHAPTER III

POLICY AND DOCTRINE

GENERAL

Our purpose in this chapter is to present a summary of current national, Department of Defense and Department of Army policy and doctrine for meeting the terrorist threat. Before proceeding to that end, it is important to introduce several preliminary factors.

First, key terms should be defined. This presents somewhat of a dilemma because virtually every concerned federal agency has its own definition for terrorism. We chose to use the Army definition in Chapter Two. The following definitions are offered for comparison:

Counter Intelligence Agency (CIA)—Terrorism is calculated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually to impress a target audience.

Department of Defense (DOD)—The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property, with the intent of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes.

Department of Justice (DOJ)—A distinct act of Domestic violence committed or threatened to be committed by a group or single individual in order to advance a political objective or greatly endangering safety or property.

Department of State (DOS)—Terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of force for political purposes in violation of domestic (local) or

international law. It involves the cynical exploitation of innocent people for the purposes of political extortion and coercion. Hostage-taking, hijacking, bombing, kidnapping and assassination are common examples of terrorist acts. Acts carried out in the course of wars, revolutions or national liberation struggles and which involve military targets are normally not considered terrorism.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civil population or a segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Fortunately, there is general consensus on other key definitions:

Antiterrorism—defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack.

Counterterrorism—offensive measures taken in response to terrorist attack.

Terrorism Counteraction—encompasses both anti- and counter-terrorism.

The second factor is that an unclassified study precludes detailed discussion of certain terrorism counteraction programs. This qualifies but does not debilitate our effort, however, because in most cases adequate unclassified, alternative sources are available.

Finally, terrorism counteraction policy and doctrine are in a state of flux. Secretary of State Shultz in a 25 October 1984 speech stated that, "A pattern of terrorist violence has emerged. It is an alarming pattern, but it is something we can identify and therefore, a threat we can devise concrete measures to do something about."¹ Responsible federal agencies have been tasked to develop these "concrete measures," consequently certain strategies

are in the developmental process. We have attempted to track these and present them along with established policy and doctrine.

NATIONAL POLICY

Historical Perspective

The advent of a formal US terrorism counteraction program can be traced back to 1972 when President Nixon established a cabinet committee to combat terrorism, in response to the tragedies at the Munich Olympics, the epidemics of kidnappings in Latin America and the murder of two US diplomats in Sudan.² The program matured when the National Security Council (NSC) initiated a study, early in the Carter Administration, to assess US abilities to develop consistent policies for dealing with terrorism and for handling specific terrorist incidents. The product of that study was the tri-level US anti-terrorism program concept.³ The program structure is shown in Figure 11.

President Reagan, inaugurated on the heels of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, assumed a no-nonsense approach toward terrorism from the beginning. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon is the catalyst for an even tougher, more comprehensive program.

Organization

The tri-level concept replaced President Nixon's Cabinet Committee with a Special Coordination Committee to assist the Chief Executive in crisis management and to be the focal point for program oversight. An interagency committee, expanded by an interagency working group was established to coordinate and provide overall guidance for planning and policy development. National Security Decision Directive 30, dated 10 April 1982, further delineated this structure and defined responsibilities in more explicit terms.⁴

TRILEVEL CONCEPT
OF THE US GOVERNMENT
ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM




Figure 11

The current structure for Crisis management is shown in Figure 12.

ORGANIZATION FOR INCIDENT MANAGEMENT




Figure 12

Although the NSC level crisis management machinery is cranked up for particular incidents, the "lead agency" concept always applies. The State Department is the lead agency for managing responses to overseas acts of terrorism and the Justice Department performs that role domestically.⁵ The Federal Aviation Agency has the lead role for response to hijackings within the US. The lead agency concept is discussed in greater detail on page 69.

Policy is also orchestrated from the top, through the Senior Interdepartmental Group, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State. Working level direction of policy is vested in the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IGT). The composition of the IGT is shown in Figure 13. This body can




FIGURE 13

be expanded by including representatives from other agencies as necessary—as many as 29 separate agencies have participated on occasion.

Program Components

Although the National terrorism counteraction program has both expanded and been refined since the Tri-level Concept was articulated in 1977, the four basic components of that program still provide a viable outline for discussing US policy.

Prevention is an antiterrorism component, consisting of international initiatives and diplomacy. The objective is to "proscribe terrorism as a matter of international law, to discredit those who engage in it, and to devise international institutions and procedures facilitating cooperative countermeasures."⁶ There are numerous examples of government success in these endeavors to include, United Nations and NATO resolutions against terrorism and the US-Cuban pact on hijackings.

Many experts consider this the most promising long term strategy against terrorism. The Long Commission after its indepth inquiry into the 1984 Beirut bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon recommended a more vigorous and demanding approach to pursuing diplomatic alternatives.⁷ Brian Jenkins, the widely renowned Rand Corporation expert on terrorism, encourages increased international cooperation to reduce the number of attacks.⁸ The Reagan administration has vowed to "publicize and condemn state supported terrorism and to use every channel of communication to dissuade other governments from sponsoring terrorism."⁹

Deterrence, also an antiterrorism measure, emphasizes protection and security; essentially target hardening.¹⁰ The attacks in Lebanon have spurred greatly increased efforts in this regard, manifested in tighter security and more control around embassies and other public buildings and facilities.

Personal security has also been stressed. The urge to "button up" must be tempered by the consideration of acceptable risk. We cannot concentrate on security at the expense of mission accomplishment.

Very much a part of the deterrence component is a policy of no concessions to terrorists. The US will not pay ransoms, will not release prisoners in response to terrorists' demands and will not bargain for the release of hostages.¹¹

The third component, Reaction, is counterterrorism oriented and refers to military operations in response to specific acts of terrorism.¹² On the domestic side, the mechanisms for reacting to terrorist incidents have been in place for some time, have become fairly sophisticated and public support for employment has been relatively strong. Most major cities and each of the 59 FBI Field Offices have SWAT teams. The FBI also has a Hostage Rescue Team trained to deal with major terrorist incidents.¹³

In the international arena, Reaction is the least established component of the governments program. Although for several years specially trained military forces (the Delta Team) have been available, the government has been hesitant to unilaterally employ this option.¹⁴ With one highly publicized exception, the attempted hostage rescue in Iran, the limiting factors have been too overwhelmingly strong. The factors which must be considered: (1) targets are usually too difficult to pinpoint, (2) incidents on foreign soil are traditionally a host nation responsibility, (3) unless we are sure that force is the only way, we run the risk of inadequate national will.

In spite of the limiting factors the most recent White House policy statements promise a more aggressive stance. Secretary Shultz provided the basis for the new policy in a 3 April 1985 speech before the Tri-lateral Commission when he said, "Certainly power must be guided by purpose but the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual."¹⁵ In

a press release regarding National Security Decision Directive 138 a White House official stated, "After a terrorist action occurs, the new approach would mean more aggressive action after the fact."¹⁶ Further it was stated that even more offensive measures were being considered, such as preemptive actions.¹⁷

Secretary of Defense Weinberger in a 28 November 1984 speech layed down certain tests to be applied before the use of force in any situation.¹⁸ In summary, they are:

1. Must be vital to US national interest or that of our allies.
2. Must plan to win.
3. Must have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. Must be flexible enough to reassess.
5. Must have the support of American people.
6. Must be a last resort.

The final program component is Prediction, which translates to the intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in support of the other three program components.¹⁹ Prediction supports both antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts.

Accurate and timely intelligence is the cornerstone of an effective terrorism counteraction program. If it is known who, where, what, when and how, any number of countermeasure options are available. An interagency committee on terrorism has been established to plan and coordinate intelligence activities, most of which are vested in the CIA, DOD and FBI. Local police and host nation intelligence are also integrated.

Although great strides have been made recently to strengthen our intelligence gathering capabilities, much remains to be done to overcome the harm done by overregulation and excessive controls imposed during the 70's. Our

Human Intelligence capabilities need special attention and this is the focus of current initiatives.¹⁹

SECTION II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY

Relationships

The DOD is active at every level within the national Terrorism counter-action structure. The Secretary sits as a member of the Senior Crisis Management Group and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Secretary Affairs or his representative serves as a member of the Interdepartmental Group on terrorism.²⁰ Other DOD officials participate in the Crisis Management working Group and on the Interagency Intelligence Committee.

Military resources committed in response to terrorist incidents are committed under the lead agency concept, introduced on page 55 and discussed in detail on page 69. Military Policies, directives and plans support the lead agencies in accordance with applicable federal laws or memorandums of agreement. Command and control of military forces involved in counterterrorist operations remains with the Department of Defense.²¹ All federal agencies to include DOD, that have resources for responding to terrorism are linked together through agency command centers as well as the National Crisis Management structure to ensure effective coordination of the US response.

Policies

Current DOD policy for countering terrorism is stipulated in DOD Directive 2000.12 as follows:

1. It is DOD policy to protect to the best of its ability DOD personnel, their dependents, facilities, and equipment from terrorist acts. Particular attention shall be given to informing and protecting high risk targets, such as key DOD personnel, US Military Assistance Advisory Groups

(MAAGs) and other military missions, technical assistance field teams, training and advisory teams, defense attache offices, nuclear weapon sites, recruiting offices, and small communications, liaison, and administrative activities considered to be especially vulnerable to terrorist acts.

2. Permanently assigned and temporary duty personnel shall be kept informed of the local terrorist threat, security measures in effect to protect them, and defensive precautions they should take to reduce their vulnerability. MAAG and similar military antiterrorism actions and procedures shall be coordinated with the US diplomatic mission in country and implemented as the local threat requires.

3. Actions and procedures to deal with terrorist activities shall be coordinated at national and field levels with the Department of State, other government agencies, and host governments, as appropriate. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by a Department of State official, has primary US Government responsibility for formulating measures to combat acts of terrorism conducted abroad. The Department of Justice has similar responsibilities within the United States, its territories and possessions.

4. Because absolute protection against terrorist activities is not possible, protective plans and procedures shall be based upon a balance between the degree of protection desired, mission requirements, and available manpower and fiscal resources.

5. Information relating to terrorist activities shall be acquired and disseminated in accordance with DOD Directive 5240.1.

DOD is one of the agencies tasked by the NCA to find new ways to fight terrorism. A strong commitment to that purpose is found in the DOD Annual Report to Congress for FY 86:

The United States will continue to seek a more active defense against terrorist attacks throughout the world. We are urging individual nations to provide appropriate safeguards in their security plans. At the same time, we are consolidating key intelligence assets and seeking the help of other nations in containing the further spread of terrorism.²²

Responsibilities

The heads of all DOD components, Secretaries of the Military Departments and Unified and Specified Commanders share the following responsibilities listed in DOD Directive 2000.12:

1. Inform their high risk personnel who are assigned or who travel to areas of known terrorist activity of the terrorist threat and of security precautions they must take.
2. Ensure that installations and activities under their control develop, maintain, and make available to assigned and visiting personnel for their protection, procedures, guidance, and instructions that:
 - (a) Are appropriate to the nature and degree of severity of the local terrorist threat, the mission of the installation and activity and other local conditions.
 - (b) Address personal, family residence, office, and vehicular security, as the circumstances warrant, particularly in response to threats or acts of bombing, kidnapping, and assassination.
3. Keep commanders and chiefs of missions informed on the nature and degree of the local terrorist threat and ensure that they are prepared to respond appropriately to changes in that threat.

In addition to the responsibilities above, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), or his designee, shall:

1. Monitor, in conjunction with other DOD Components, programs to protect DOD personnel and their dependents from terrorist acts.
2. Be the OSD representative on the IG/T.
3. Provide a forum for the exchange of ideas with other DOD Components regarding efforts to protect DOD personnel and their dependents.
4. Provide to DOD components necessary assistance to support their antiterrorism efforts.
5. Develop, publish, and maintain DOD 2000.12-II, consistent with DOD 5025.1-M. This handbook shall provide guidance in protective measures to reduce the vulnerability of DOD personnel to terrorism.

In addition to the responsibilities above, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, or their designees, shall establish Military Service programs to provide expert and direct assistance to commanders in those areas where a particularly high terrorist threat exists.

In addition to the responsibilities above, Unified and Specified Commanders with territorial responsibilities, or their designees, shall:

1. Ensure proper coordination of all local policies and measure to protect DOD personnel and their dependents abroad from terrorist acts, and assist theater Military Service commanders in implementing Military Service programs developed under this Directive.
2. Serve as the DOD point of contact with US embassies and host-country officials on matters regarding such policies and measures. Chiefs of MAAGs are authorized to deal directly with the US diplomatic missions in their host countries on these matters.

In addition to the responsibilities under subsection E.1., above, the Heads of the Military Services, the Directors, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), or designees, shall, consistent with the provisions of DOD Directive 5240.1 ensure that intelligence information on terrorist threats is disseminated promptly to include specific warning of threats against DOD personnel and their dependents. This information shall be disseminated routinely by the Military Services, DIA and NSA/CSS, to DOD Components whose personnel travel to foreign countries, to apprise them of the general terrorist threats they may encounter. DOD 2000.12-H provides guidance on protective measures that the traveler should take. Upon request, DIA shall provide threat assessments for key senior OSD personnel.

ARMY POLICY AND DOCTRINE

General

The Army has maintained one of the most dynamic terrorism counteraction programs of all the federal agencies during the past seven years. Until last year, (1984), however, the program was focused on responding to terrorist activity on military installations. For this reason the Army had to feel

included in the Long Commission finding "that much needs to be done to prepare US Military forces to defend against and counter terrorism."²³

Accepting the Long Commission challenge and responding to the NCA tasking to develop new strategies for meeting the terrorist threat, DA has formed a Terrorism Counteraction Task Force. Many initiatives have been introduced with the following being among the most important:

- o Terrorism counteraction has been designated a DCSOPS responsibility, elevating the focus from just Law Enforcement. Physical security and other traditional preventive measures remain under the DCSPER, administered through the Law Enforcement Division. At major command and post level the G-3/S-3 is responsible for terrorism counteraction. At this level the Provost Marshal develops contingency plans to respond to terrorist incidents on the installation but the operations element normally implements, trains, test and revises the plan.
- o An intense effort is underway to upgrade doctrinal publications and training. Army Regulation 190-52, Countering Terrorism and other Major Disruptions on Military Installations is currently being revised. Training and Doctrine Command published TRADOC Pam 525-37, US Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction, in March 1984 to describe the Army's role in terrorism counteraction and to provide a framework for developing doctrine. The new doctrine addresses terrorism across the spectrum of warfare. A new field manual, entitled Terrorism Counteraction is currently being written. Training is discussed in detail on page 73.
- o Intelligence is being stressed at every level in recognition of the fact that US success against terrorism is dependent on timely, user-specific information on the threat. Intelligence is discussed on page 65.

The Army's role in terrorism counteraction is described in TRADOC Pam 525-37 as follows:

1. Collecting, processing, and analyzing threat information.
2. Educating its members on the threat and disseminating threat intelligence.
3. Planning for military operations to prevent and counter terrorist activities.
4. Planning and executing procedures to evacuate family members and other nonmilitary and nonmission essential personnel, should a host country be unable to protect them.
5. Providing personnel and installation protection measures against the threat.
6. Responding, as required, with selected, specially trained forces to counter the threat.
7. Assisting friendly governments and other elements of the US Government as authorized.
8. Advising allied or friendly military organizations in relation to the creation of organizations and systems to counteract terrorism.
9. Coordinating continually with host nation authorities (for military installations not within the US).

The most effective way to discuss how the Army performs its role in terrorism counteraction is in terms of intelligence, antiterrorism, counterterrorism, and training. The primary source of information is TRADOC Pam 525-37, which was supplemented by AR 190-52 and TC 19-16.

Intelligence

Intelligence is critical to terrorism counteraction. Intelligence assets, employing an all source program, collect, process and disseminate intelligence and information to provide the commander with the information he needs to deter, neutralize or lessen the effects of terrorist activities. During peacetime, Army Intelligence activities are limited by federal law and

host nation agreements. They must also comply with Presidential executive orders, Army Regulations and MOUs with other agencies. This dictates that, within the US, most information is obtained through liaison and in coordination with the FBI. Outside the US, information is obtained by liaison with the host nation, in coordination with the lead agency (DOS) and specialized counterintelligence and human intelligence activities.

Responsibilities of Army intelligence agencies break out as follows:

- o The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) provides guidance and develops policies, plans and procedures.
- o The US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has overall responsibility for directing, coordinating and controlling all Army intelligence activities targeted against terrorism. INSCOM maintains liaison with US and host nation intelligence agencies. Local INSCOM activities provide area coverage at all levels of command. An agency of INSCOM, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) distributes threat warnings and provides current data concerning terrorist groups on request.
- o US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) collects and evaluates criminal information and distributes terrorist-related information to all levels.

Major commands and installations also support the intelligence effort against terrorism.

- o Intelligence staff elements report all actual or suspected terrorist activity up and down the chain. They also provide all intelligence support to the local commander. In addition they maintain liaison with the local provost marshal, Criminal Investigation Division and INSCOM field offices.

- o Local provost marshals and CID district and field offices report all terrorist activity and maintain liaison with the command intelligence staff and local police agencies.

Intelligence interoperability is key to maintaining a viable program. This is recognized at the national level by the creation of the Interagency Intelligence Committee and at Army level by the designation of ITAC as the central point of contact for terrorist-related intelligence. Controlled liaison with civilian and host nation intelligence agencies provides an essential exchange of information, prevents duplication of effort and reduces the likelihood of compromising on-going intelligence collection efforts.

It is also recognized that terrorist related intelligence comes from many resources. One of the most important is police activities which provide information on criminal activities.

Open source information such as magazines and newspapers provide extensive information. This material can be retained only as provided in AR 380-13 and 381-10.

Ultimately threat analysis, the process of compiling and examining all available information to develop indicators of future terrorist activities, provides the commander with the intelligence he needs to take action. This process takes place at every level with ITAC compiling a central data base. From this data base, ITAC provides worldwide, area, and specific threat analysis to the army. Major commands tailor or augment ITAC analysis to produce area specific analyses which are continually updated. This process occurs in both peace and war.

Anti Terrorism

As defined previously, anti-terrorism addresses those defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability of personnel (to include family members),

facilities, and equipment to terrorist attack. Anti-terrorism includes intelligence, threat analysis and preventive measures to include operations security, personnel protection, individual protection and physical security. Intelligence and threat analysis were discussed in the preceding pages. A discussion of the preventive measures follows.

Operations Security (OPSEC) is the process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions. OPSEC as it relates to terrorism counteraction, is concerned with controlling information and detectable activities which could enable a terrorist to effectively exploit a target's weaknesses and neutralize or preempt a counterterrorist response.

Personnel protection in terrorism counteraction pertains to those measures taken to protect personnel from criminal or terrorists acts. Personnel protection programs are designed to provide protective measures and to create a threat awareness in people, especially those considered as high-risk potential targets. Included are protective services and individual protection measures.

Protective services safeguard a designated individual from political embarrassment, assassination, kidnapping and injury. USACIDC provides protective services to safeguard the Secretary and Deputy Secretaries of Defense and under Secretary of the Army; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and The Chief and Vice Chief of the Army. On orders from the commander, USACIDC will provide protective services to other personnel. Individual provost marshals, within their capabilities, provide protective services to other high risk individuals as designated by the local command.

Individual protection measures are techniques which when practiced, decrease individual vulnerability to terrorist attack. Individual protection is a matter of being trained what to do and having the discipline to practice what is learned. Techniques include varying routes to and from work; being

alert to and reporting unusual activity; taking the proper security measures at home or during travel; and staying informed as to the threat. High risk personnel such as general officers may also need training in evasive driving, self-protection and hostage survival. Physical security improvements of quarters and offices may also be appropriate.

Physical security protects and safeguards personnel from terrorist acts and prevents unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materiel and documents. Physical security measures are tailored to the threat. A comprehensive plan is developed by the provost marshal addressing lock and key control; protective barriers; lighting and sensors; military police patrols, vehicle checks, and searches; community relations programs; and neighborhood crime watch. Field manual 19-30 and Training circular 19-16 outline vulnerability assessment.

The provost marshal office is only one of several Army agencies involved in physical security. USACIDC provides crime prevention surveys. INSCOM conducts OPSEC evaluations. The Military Police School provides doctrine and training.

Counter Terrorism

Counter terrorism includes those offensive measures taken in response to terrorist acts. It involves the employment of forces to resolve terrorist incidents in both peace and war.

Operations range from local force response on a military installation to assisting allies if requested by the host nation and approved by the NCA. Missions across the spectrum of war include rescuing hostages, locating and recovering sensitive items and assaulting terrorist positions.

As stated previously the US Government terrorism counteraction program is based on the Lead-agency concept. The DOJ is the lead agency for responding

to terrorist acts that occur within the US, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico and US possessions and territories.

The FBI is, of course, the operational element for the DOJ. FBI capabilities include planning and executing contingency missions, negotiating for hostages, providing special operations and research units, providing special weapons and tactics teams, and providing terrorism research and bomb data units. The FBI is promptly notified of all domestic incidents and will assume jurisdiction if the Attorney General or his designee determines that it is a matter of significant federal interest. DOJ and DOD have initiated a MOU to govern procedures to be followed by each agency in domestic terrorism incidents. If the FBI elects not to intervene, on-post operations are directed to their conclusion by the commander. Operations are normally three-phased as shown in Figure 14. Army Command and control is discussed in Appendix 2.

Off post response by military forces to domestic terrorism incidents is governed by the Posse Commitatus Act. These incidents are normally exclusively the domain of civil law enforcement and the FBI and exceptions require NCA approval. DOD Directive 5525.5 and AR 500-51 also provide guidelines for off post employment of military forces. In certain circumstances terrorist acts may be viewed as a form of civil disturbance and this is an area where there was extensive experience with using military forces during the late 60's and early 70's. Army Regulation 500-50 governs these activities. The lending of military equipment to civil law enforcement is not a violation of the Posse Commitatus but the disposition of such equipment must be in accordance with Army Regulation 500-51 and Army Regulation 700-131.

The Department of State is the lead agency for terrorism against US forces and personnel outside of the US or its possessions and territories. These responsibilities are in accordance with international law and applicable

Figure 14

Responding to terrorist acts on a military installation

	Military Installation within the US (Lead agency - DOJ)	Military Installation outside the US (Lead agency - DOS)
PHASE I	Commander employs installation law enforcement personnel and supporting resources.	SAME
	The FBI, DA OP Center, and higher headquarters are notified.	Higher headquarters, host nation and the DOS (country team) are notified.
PHASE II	Commitment of the FBI or military forces from outside the installation.	Commitment of host nation forces or military forces outside the installation.
	-FBI can assume jurisdiction if the incident is of signifi- cant national interest.	
	-Military forces remain under military command but assist FBI consistent with the MOU between DOJ and DOD.	
PHASE III	NCA commits additional mili- tary resources.	Host nation commits specifi- cally trained forces.

status of forces agreements. Coordination with the host nation is accom-
plished by the DOS.

Military response on military installations outside of the US follows
three phases very similar to those followed for incidents within the US (See
Figure 14). The principal difference, of course, is that rather than an FBI
role, there is a host nation role.

Use of military forces off-post, outside the US depends on the incident
site (military versus non-military), the nature of the incident (sensitivity
and who is involved), the extent of foreign government involvement and the
overall threat to US security interests. The specific role of US military
forces in such incidents are coordinated by the DOS and the US ambassador.

Circumstances under which US forces would be employed include situations where the host nation cannot protect US citizens, the terrorism is beyond the capability of the host nation to combat, and/or the country requests assistance. In a country, confronted with insurgency, US military involvement ranges from an advisory role to direct application of forces. Parameters are established by various federal agencies governing limitations and restrictions of deployed US military assets.

Counterterrorist operations span the spectrum of conflict. In fact, the probability of terrorism and other acts of subversion is heightened during periods of hostilities. Both violent and passive terrorist measures are expected in friendly rear areas. Soviet doctrine advocates such actions and their forces are trained to perform this role.

Civil law enforcement agencies continue to respond to terrorism during wartime but it may be extremely difficult to determine whether acts are being committed by terrorist or by lawful combatants against military objectives. Therefore, commanders are prepared to respond quickly to host nation requests for assistance or to respond unilaterally when US personnel or property are threatened. Such response, against lawful combatants committing terrorist type acts will be in accordance with the international laws of war (LOW). The LOW applies only to declared war and other armed conflict meeting specific criteria. The LOW does not cover terrorism in general or terrorist in particular. When terrorists do not fall within the LOW, they are treated as criminals. Missions include rescuing hostages, locating and recovering sensitive items, attacking terrorist personnel and installations, and interrupting terrorist logistical bases.

Military forces committed to counter terrorism operations usually require special training and equipment depending on the type and complexity of the

operation. Units must employ stealth, audacity, self-control and be capable of attacking swiftly. The Delta Team is so trained but the NCA must make the decision to employ this force. To a much lesser degree and for limited operations, usually on military installations, a local Special Reaction Team (SRT) is trained (See Appendix 2). General purpose forces are capable of providing support to specially trained forces and may play an even larger role when trained to do so. Training is covered in the following pages.

Training

Since 1980 when the US Army Military Police School (USAMPS) taught the first Countering Terrorism Course, great strides have been made in training selected Army personnel in terrorism counteraction. Since 1982, a primary focus has been to make terrorism training more than just a law enforcement matter. The US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) and Special Warfare Center (SWC), although in the program from the start, have greatly expanded their roles. The heightened awareness of the terrorist threat that occurred with the Lebanon bombing made 1984 by far the most dynamic year for training, with 1985 promising even more innovations.

The most important accomplishments in 1984 were the approval of the Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction (Published in TC 535-37) and the staffing of the Terrorism Counteraction Office (TCO) at Fort Leavenworth (See Figure 15). These accomplishments provide the basis and direction for numerous other initiatives. The TRADOC training strategy for terrorism counteraction includes both resident and non-resident means. On the resident side, many service schools already include Terrorism Counteraction in certain POI's. Those that do not will soon be required to do so (i.e. all advance courses have been directed to include at least one hour). The big three

TERRORISM COUNTER ACTION DOCTRINE AND TRAINING ORGANIZATION




Figure 15

trainers (USAMPS, USAICS, and SWC) provide training for commanders, staffs and specialized personnel. The courses that these schools offer are shown below:

USAMPS

Present Courses:

Counter Terrorism on Military Installations--offers selected staff officers and NCOs a systematic means to counter the terrorist threat.

Senior Officer Terrorism Counteraction Seminar--offers Chief of Staff and Dep Cdrs overview of how to counter the terrorist threat.

Scheduled Courses:

General Officers Evasive Driving Course--provides GO and spouses with hands on training in driving techniques.

Evasive Driving for GO Drivers and Protective Service Personnel--offers hands-on driver training.

Special Reaction Team Training--train installation teams in prerequisite skills (Note: This training was offered by Air Force but did not meet the needs of the field. Commanders wanted to train teams, not individuals).

Proposed Courses:

Hostage Negotiators Course--offers selected CID agents and other personnel training in hostage negotiation skills.

Protective Services Detail Course--provides personnel selected for PSD with requisite skills.

USAICS

Scheduled Courses:

Intelligence in Terrorism Counteraction--offers selected intelligence personnel prerequisite skills for terrorist analyst duties.

SNC

Present Courses:

Individual Terrorism Awareness—offers high risk personnel and spouses threat awareness and self-protection skills.

Terrorism in Low Intensity Conflicts—offers commanders and staffs responsible for planning, understanding of relationship between terrorist and LIC.

Scheduled Courses:

Anti-Terrorism Instructor Qualification Course—offers command designated personnel skills to present terrorism counter action training.

Non-resident training includes films/TV tapes, doctrinal materiels and mobile training teams. The big three trainers provide the mobile training teams which visit installations and units, providing on site training to commanders, staffs and specialty personnel such as drivers, SRTs and protective services.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATIONAL STRATEGY

National strategy development must address several factors in addition to the demographics of terrorist groups. First and foremost is the fact that terrorism will remain a problem for the foreseeable future. Second the US, its allies, and other nations must accept the tenure of terrorism and learn to protect themselves and deal with the problem within their capabilities. Third, future conflicts in the world will probably be of the low intensity variety where terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and limited conventional warfare are combined to achieve political or other objectives. Fourth, terrorists do not categorize their actions as low intensity, but consider they are in a full scale war with some kind of basic objective in mind. Last, as governments have become more proactive in dealing with terrorism, the terrorists have adjusted their tactics—more indiscriminate bombings are taking place, suicide delivery means are being employed, NATO as well as individual governments has become a target and state supported terrorism is on the rise.

The following are some of the more prominent suggestions offered in the literature as ways the government should deal with terrorism:

- Raise the level of international consciousness and outrage about the human and spiritual toll inflicted by terrorist acts.
- The US must refrain from behavior that reflects it is using terrorist tactics or sponsoring terrorism.
- Harden vulnerable targets.

- Increase and improve intelligence gathering activities.
- Enhance the current interagency structure by giving it a permanent staff, resources, and a strong charter.
- Strengthen US capabilities for carrying out rescue operations at home and abroad.
- The US should encourage other nations to reach to an international anti-terrorist agreement similar to the current anti-hijacking agreement.
- Maintain a non-concession policy.
- Maintain the capability to be flexible in responding to a terrorist act.
- Use US military forces in offensive and defensive operations against terrorists.

Robert Kupperman and David Williamson have very aptly stated the first step the US government should take in developing their strategy for terrorism: "Let's Calm Down and Get Smart About Terrorism" (title of their article).

We're getting edgy about terrorism. In a pique of understandable frustration, Secretary of State George Shultz has implored the American public to support retaliatory or even preemptive military actions against international terrorism. . .

Our government already has policies, laws, security agreements, experience, and many other means that can be applied to the problem without having to take extreme measures at this time. For example, the State Department has formed the Overseas Security Advisory Council to provide advice and emergency help to US businesses abroad. Congress has appropriated \$356 million to upgrade embassy security. Extra security measures have been taken to protect government facilities in Washington, DC.

Our analysis of the situation reveals that the development of a dramatic new national anti-terrorism strategy is not necessary, but that we should refine and build upon what is already in place. This would include:

— Continued physical security enhancement of US facilities around the world. It is hard for the authors to believe that the security lessons learned in Vietnam have so quickly escaped. The world today is not a safe place to live—criminals, crazies, and crusaders are always at work trying to be heard or gain something. The days of open embassies; poor physical security systems at nuclear weapon/munitions storage sites; macho ambassadors, high government officials, and military general officers who shun even the most basic security measures and/or precautions; the tourist or soldier abroad who feel they are not important enough to be targets; and the thought that terrorism is not a state supported mode of warfare are over. Security consciousness must prevail and be fostered by the US government in its strategy.

— The national will of the people of the US must be behind the strategy selected. The public must understand the problem, its consequences, and the government action or reaction to the problem.

— Someone must be in charge! The authors have not gotten the impression that the Terrorism Counteraction Programs of all agencies of the government are fully coordinated. There are very good initiatives being undertaken by many agencies, but it is difficult to determine who in the hierarchy understands all that is going on and is influencing the action to the good of all. An obvious example of this problem is the inability of the various agencies to develop a common definition of terrorism.

— Terrorism must be defined. The lack of a common definition has impeded the building of international norms and international cooperation. Very simply, we must agree on what the problem is before we can agree on methods to combat it.

— We must improve our intelligence gathering capabilities and the dissemination of concise, useable information. This will require legislation in

some cases to remove unreasonable restrictions imposed during the 70's. The gathering of information will be extremely difficult because terrorist groups are hard to identify, and extremely difficult to penetrate. The information collected is often sketchy, incomplete and contradictory, however, it must be culled out of the intelligence bureaucracy and transmitted in a quickly useable manner. This is key to successful protection and counteraction.

— The US will not unilaterally solve the terrorist problem. International information sharing and mutual support agreements must be developed to contain the future spread of terrorism.

— The US must maintain the capability to preempt and retaliate against acts of terrorism. However, these capabilities must be very judiciously used and implemented only upon Presidential directive. The government must show that its actions are directed solely at quelling the terrorists and their collaborators and that the actions taken were strictly accomplished to protect a US interest. Preemption is an extremely touchy method of dealing with terrorism, but it is commonly used by the police in the US to halt criminal acts before they occur.

— The US government policy on concessions is very clear and should remain unchanged.

— The role of the US military in domestic terrorism should remain the same. The military can very effectively support by protecting its own assets, providing training, providing bomb disposal assistance, and by maintaining specially trained forces. There should be no domestic expansion of the military's role. The military must remain in a high state of readiness for overseas deployment to conduct rescue operations.

— A government policy of flexible response must be maintained. We must be firm in dealing with terrorism and have available a full range of options with which to counter terrorist acts. Options would range from negotiations

to the employment of military resources to counter the threat. Options used must be selected on a case by case basis and always implemented using the least amount of force necessary. The tendency to overreact in these situations is high and controls must be established to prohibit this from happening.

MILITARY STRATEGY

The military recognizes that terrorism has become an enduring threat that will persist in both peace and war. In response, the DOD and particularly, the Army have begun to move from a policy and doctrine that only addressed domestic terrorism in peacetime to a comprehensive strategy encompassing both domestic and international terrorism across the full spectrum of warfare.

DOD is well represented at the national level in crisis management and policy development. A system has evolved that links DOD elements into the national terrorist crisis management structure all the way from installations, through higher headquarters, to the ISC. Adequate MOUs and working agreements have been developed with the lead agencies, DOJ and DOS, which are supported by DOD counterterrorism policies and plans. Anti-terrorism policies are stressed within DOD with emphasis placed on the safeguarding of personnel, facilities and equipment. In this regard, it is recognized that absolute protection is impossible and that protective plans and procedures should be based upon a balance between the degree of protection desired, mission requirements and available manpower and fiscal resources.

The Army terrorism counteraction program was provided significant momentum by establishing a Terrorism Task Force at DA, creating a Terrorism Counteraction Office at Fort Leavenworth to coordinate training and doctrine, and publishing an operational concept for terrorism counteraction in TRADOC Pam

525-37. New terrorism counteraction programs of instruction have been introduced at supporting TRADOC schools and non-resident training support packages have been developed to conduct training on-site at Army units and installations. The policies for responding to terrorist incidents on military installations are basically sound and well supported by doctrinal publications. Doctrinal publications are now being written to provide guidance for a total strategy, headlined by a Field Manual on Counterterrorism.

In short, the DOD and Army terrorism counteraction programs seem to be on target. Our analysis shows no need for radical changes but some refinements could be made that would strengthen the programs. Recommendations to accomplish this end are as follows:

- DOD must provide more definitive guidance on "acceptable risks" in terms of the balance between desired protection, mission requirements and resources. This has impact on both operational and fiscal planning and it is appropriate that the standards should be provided by DOD so that all the services will be playing by the same rules. Most important, the definitive guidance would facilitate setting priorities for protection allowing for the most wise use of resources.

- A full time Terrorism Office should be established and staffed under DCSOPS. To the best of our understanding, the only personnel working full time on terrorism at the DA level are found in ITAC. The TOO is already full time within TRADOC. Creating a full time office in DCSOPS would heighten visibility, enhance access and maintain program momentum. Our concern is that as the memory of the attack on the Marine Barracks in Lebanon fades, so will the zeal for terrorism counteraction and that personnel with multiple missions will very naturally give their attention to the "priority for the day."

- Counterterrorism doctrine should be integrated into FM 100-5, Operations. Even with the projected Field Manual on Counterterrorism, there is

still a need to include counterterrorism doctrine in FM 100-5. This will serve to call it to the attention of planners and operators and to give it legitimacy as an operational concept in response to a very significant threat. We concur with the TRADOC Pam 525-37 assessment, that the probability of terrorism and other acts of sabotage is heightened during hostilities. The probability of terrorism does not go down, as some would contend, as the level of conflict goes up.

Training for Special Reaction Teams (SRT) should be conducted in a non-resident mode as collective training. If the Army is serious about terrorism counteraction, then SRTs must be well trained because they provide the commander's first and possibly only (if the FBI does not intervene) line of defense against terrorist violence on post. The commitment of specially trained forces lies with the NCA. Currently it is almost impossible to maintain a trained SRT because training has been conducted by the Air Force on an individual basis in a resident mode. The SRT should be trained collectively and it is our opinion that on-site training by a mobile training team would be the most practical, efficient and cost effective means. Command designated instructors could attend the SWC anti-terrorism instructor course to provide a capability for in house refresher training.

— Army Skill Identifiers should be approved for SRT members, terrorist analyst (trained at USAICS) and hostage negotiators. The ASI is essential for personnel management of these specially trained soldiers. There is no other way to track their proper utilization.

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APPENDIX 1

TERRORIST INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST US ARMY PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES SINCE 1980

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CIRCUMSTANCES</u>
Wisconsin	14 Jan 80	Attempted theft of weapons from armory.
Puerto Rico	26 Feb 80	Shot fired at US Army Jeep.
Puerto Rico	12 Mar 80	ROTC vehicle ambushed.
New York	28 Jun 80	Arson, recruiting station, New York City.
California	12 Jul 80	Arson, recruiting station, San Francisco.
Berlin	4 Sep 80	Damage to uniforms and instruments of 298th Army Band.
Turkey	2 Oct 80	Bombing, Army facilities.
Italy	6 Oct 80	Damage to privately owned vehicles belonging to Army personnel.
Turkey	7 Nov 80	Bombing of US military building.
Turkey	25 Nov 80	Bombing of US military building.
Turkey	27 Nov 80	Bombing of NATO Rod and Gun Club.
Turkey	2 Dec 80	Assassination threat against US military officers.
Puerto Rico	12 Jan 81	Bomb threat at Ft. Buchanan.
Germany	2 Feb 81	Attempted firebombing, US helicopters.
Illinois	3 Feb 81	Bomb threat, Armed Forces Examination and Entrance Station, Chicago.
Illinois	5 Feb 81	Shot fired at ROTC vehicle, Chicago.
Germany	2 Mar 81	Arson, Army generators.
Germany	13 Mar 81	Attempted bombing, military facilities.
Germany	29 Mar 81	Bombing, Military Intelligence field office.
Germany	30 Mar 81	Firebombing, civilian personnel office.
Germany	9 Apr 81	Firebombing, two US military installations.
Germany	11 Apr 81	Demonstration, damage to US facilities.
Germany	12 Apr 81	Bomb, petroleum, oil, and lubricant distribution point.
Germany	12 Apr 81	Detention of military duty train.
Germany	16 Apr 81	Bomb attempt, community headquarters.
Tennessee	6 May 81	Fire bombing of privately owned vehicle belonging to recruiter.
Germany	9 May 81	Demonstration, damage to Army facilities and privately owned vehicles.
Germany	25 May 81	Firebombing, Army dining facility.
Puerto Rico	7 Aug 81	Bomb attempt, ROTC building.
Germany	19 Aug 81	Arson, Army vehicles.
Germany	1 Sep 81	Arson, privately owned vehicles belonging to military personnel.
Germany	15 Sep 81	Assassination attempt, Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe.

Italy	17 Dec 81	Kidnapping, Army general officer, NATO staff.
France	18 Jan 82	Assassination, Army attache.
Germany	12 Apr 82	Firebombing, Army and Air Force Exchange Service trucks.
Lebanon	17 Apr 82	Attempted assassination, Army attache, Beirut.
Germany	31 May 82	Bombing, officers clubs and Abrams Building (V Corps headquarters).
Germany	1 Jun 82	Attempted bombing, Armed Forces Network tower.
Germany	1 Jun 82	Bombing, officers club, Bremerhaven.
Germany	1 Jun 82	Bombing, officers club, Gelmhausen.
Germany	1 Jun 82	Bombing, officers club, Hanau.
Germany	1 Jun 82	Bombing, credit union, Frankfurt.
Germany	29 Jun 82	Arson, medical evacuation helicopter, Galstedt.
Germany	2 Jul 82	Bombing, two communication trailers, Frankfurt.
Germany	20 Jul 82	Attempted firebombing, petroleum, oil, and lubricant site, Osterholz.
Germany	3 Aug 82	Firebombing, three vehicles in motor pool, Schwabisch Gmund.
Germany	5 Aug 82	Bombing, officers club, Karlsruhe.
Germany	11 Aug 82	Bombing, privately owned vehicle, Atterberry Housing Area, Frankfurt.
Germany	19 Aug 82	Incendiary device and small fire, near ground control antenna—no damage, Heidelberg Army Airfield.
Germany	28 Sep 82	Explosive device found outside main gate, Koenigstuhle Defense Communications Station, Heidelberg.
Germany	9 Oct 82	Explosion, damaged privately own vehicles, Drake Edwards Housing Area, Frankfurt.
Germany	17 Oct 82	Explosion, one privately owned vehicle destroyed and several others damaged, Gibbs Housing Area, Frankfurt.
Germany	19 Oct 82	Fire, damaged privately owned vehicle in front of off-post quarters, Bangloli.
Germany	19 Oct 82	Fire, damaged US and privately owned vehicles, Frankfurt area.
Germany	20 Oct 82	Tires slashed on 23 privately owned vehicles and anti-US slogans painted on vehicles, Neureut Government leased housing area, Karlsruhe.
Germany	22 Oct 82	Tires slashed on 18 privately owned vehicles and six license plates stolen, Munich.
Germany	31 Oct 82	Bomb detonation, destroyed/damaged 16 privately owned vehicles and damaged six nearby buildings. Total estimated cost of detonation \$130,000, Dulles Housing Area, Giessen.

Germany	3 Nov 82	Three German nationals observed with 10 liter gas cans in Platan Housing Area, Frankfurt.
Germany	4 Nov 82	Privately owned vehicle set on fire in Segal Housing Area, Frankfurt.
Germany	11 Nov 82	Attempted arson of a boiler plant, Edwards Housing Area, Frankfurt.
Germany	14 Nov 82	Explosive device found in underground garage, Government leased housing, Frankfurt.
Germany	20 Nov 82	Two individuals tossed a bomb into the Kalb housing area with no damage, Nuernberg.
Wisconsin	20 Nov 82	Fire, unknown persons using solid fuel and flares ignited vehicle at the Madison Reserve Center.
Germany	14 Dec 82	Explosive, car bomb, economy quarters, Butzbach.
Germany	14 Dec 82	Car bomb found attached to vehicle, economy quarters, Fechenheim.
Germany	15 Dec 82	Explosion, car bomb, bachelor officers quarters building (EOQ), Jefferson Village Housing Area, Darmstadt.
Germany	21 Dec 82	Tires slashed, 45 automobiles belonging to US military personnel, in and around John F. Kennedy Housing Area, Heilbronn.
Germany	1 Jan 83	Fire, privately owned vehicle parked in locked compound, damaged by Molotov cocktail, Bremen.
Germany	17 Jan 83	US Army duty train forced to stop, severed railroad control signal cable between Bremen and Bremerhaven.
Germany	21 Jan 83	Attempted fire bombing of US military privately own vehicle, Stuttgart.
Germany	24 Jan 83	US Army training facility target of fire extinguisher bomb, wooded area, Idar-Oberstein.
Germany	25 Jan 83	Discovery of second fire extinguisher bomb US Army training facility, Idar-Oberstein.
Germany	2 Feb 83	US troop train braking system damaged while stopped for track clearance, Nuernberg/Bayreuth Stations.
Germany	22 Feb 83	Dummy fire extinguisher bomb in US Army troop barracks, Gelnhausen.
Germany	19 Mar 83	US military member's privately owned vehicle destroyed in arson attack, Frankfurt.
Italy	11 Apr 83	US Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) command clothing warehouse damaged in incendiary attack, Vicenza.
Germany	12 Apr 83	US military members' privately owned vehicles damaged in fire, Mainz.
Germany	25 Apr 83	US train derailed on line leading to Rose Barracks, Grafenwoehr.
Washington, D.C.	26 Apr 83	US National War College building damaged in bombing, Ft. McNair.

New York	12 May 83	Two, reserve centers (one Navy, one Army) damaged in metropolitan New York area.
Germany	21 May 83	Bombing of Allied forces parade reviewing stand, West Berlin.
New York	21 Aug 83	US Army reserve center damaged by bombing, New York City.
Puerto Rico	23 Jul 83	ROTC Office strafed, Univ of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras Campus.
Germany	7 Nov 83	US military depot undamaged by faulty incendiary device, Hanau-Grossauheim.
Turkey	23 Nov 83	Assault and attempted kidnapping of US Army member, Corlu.
Germany	4 Dec 83	US military Pershing II missile transport vehicle damaged by four German nationals, Karbt Kasern Schwaebisch-Gmund.

SOURCE: US Congress. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations. Military Construction Appropriations for 1985. pp. 246-248.

APPENDIX 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Counterterrorist operations on military installations are covered thoroughly by existing doctrine. TC 19-16, Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations was published in 1983. The Military Police School has taught the Countering Terrorism course since 1980.

Command and control of counterterrorist operations off the installation is classified and is not discussed.

The installation commander is responsible for command and control of installation resources during a terrorist incident. Command and control actions, however, are typically planned, coordinated, and directed by the emergency operations center (EOC) which is activated immediately when terrorist incidents occur. The EOC controls or assists in directing the military response and coordinates with higher, lower, and adjacent military headquarters and organizations. The installation terrorism response model for command and control showing the relationship of the EOC to subordinate threat response activities is depicted at Figure 16. Planning considerations and measures for counterterrorism operations on military installations are discussed in detail in TC 19-16. Operations are characterized by three phases shown in Figure 14.

The threat response contingency plan outlines specified duties and responsibilities. It describes circumstances for implementing the plan, notification procedures, concept of operations, mission priorities, use of force options, decisionmaking parameters (local and higher levels), resource requirements, and checklists of actions to be taken by EOC members, crisis management

CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION




Figure 16

team members, and the threat management force (TMF). The provost marshal normally develops the plan in coordination with the installation staff, to include the staff judge advocate. The operational staff element, i.e., the G-3 or Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), normally implements, trains, tests, and revises the plan. It is emphasized that the plan is coordinated and understood by all concerned, to include all potential response agencies.

The crisis management team (CMT), composed of selected representatives from the installation staff, is formed to assist the commander in controlling the incident. The CMT consists of the provost marshal security force commander, chief of staff, G1 (personnel), G2 (intelligence), G3 (operations), G4 (logistics), staff judge advocate, public affairs officer, engineer, and communications officer. The CMT provides advice to the commander, EOC staff, and the TMF through the EOC.

The TMF is the tactical element of the EOC. The TMF commander has operational control of all installation military forces at the incident site. The TMF is composed of the following:

Special reaction teams which isolate and contain the incident, report information, rescue hostages and nonparticipants, and assault terrorist positions. (Rescue and assault missions are performed only under special circumstances or when a more qualified force is not available.)

Inner and outer perimeter elements which secure the incident site, control access to the area, and provide security to the remainder of the installation.

Hostage negotiation teams which are trained to conduct direct communication with the terrorists. Negotiations are conducted to further develop the situation for key decisionmakers. USACIDC provides trained negotiators at District Offices and Field Offices on most installations.

The employment of forces usually starts with installation law enforcement personnel. MP or security patrols on duty at the time of a terrorist incident are the initial response force. They isolate, contain, and evaluate the incident and provide the initial report to the provost marshal. When the incident is declared to be a possible terrorist act, the installation terrorist threat response contingency plan is implemented, and the FBI, the Army Operations Center, and higher headquarters are notified immediately.

When the FBI assumes jurisdiction of an incident, military personnel continue to support the FBI as needed. Command and control of military personnel remains with the military.

Upon termination of the incident, certain key military personnel, if requested by the FBI, collect and process evidence for possible criminal prosecution. Investigation results are coordinated with local military intelligence elements who, in turn, forward them to ITAC.

For incidents occurring on post outside the US, the DOS through the Office for Combatting Terrorism provides the leadership and core personnel for formation of a crisis management task force. The task force may draw on area or functional expertise from within the Department or foreign governments, as appropriate.

The basic responsibility for response to terrorist activities outside the US lies with the host nation. Status-of-forces agreements, however, may grant the right (not the responsibility) to US forces to do whatever is necessary to maintain order and security on the installation. US procedures for responding to terrorist incidents on the installation are established according to US and host nation law and status-of-forces agreements and in coordination with host nation governmental agencies. See Figure 16.

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